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Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) are a growing subset of the emerging Internet of
Things (IoT). WSNs reduce the cost of deployment over wired alternatives; conse-
quently, use is increasing in home automation, critical infrastructure, smart metering,
and security solutions. Few published works evaluate the security of proprietary WSN
protocols due to the lack of low-cost and eective research tools. One such protocol is
ITU-T G.9959-based Z-Wave, which maintains wide acceptance within the IoT mar-
ket. This research utilizes an open source toolset, presented herein, called EZ-Wave to
identify methods for exploiting Z-Wave devices and networks using Software-Dened
Radios (SDR). Herein, techniques enabling active network reconnaissance, including
network enumeration and device interrogation, are presented. Furthermore, a fuzzing
framework is presented and utilized to identify three packet malformations result-
ing in anomalous device behavior. Finally, a method for classifying the three most
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WSNs are a growing subset of the emerging IoT with increasing application in
home automation, critical infrastructure, smart metering, and security solutions.
Technology research rm Gartner estimates the IoT to include four billion connected
devices in the home by the end of 2016 and predicts the number of devices will grow to
13.5 billion by 2020 [Gar15]. While open wireless standards, such as IEEE 802.15.4,
have been studied at length due to the availability of tools like the KillerBee Exploita-
tion Framework [Wri09], few published works evaluate the security of the proprietary
Z-Wave protocol, despite growing popularity. The most pronounced applications of
Z-Wave are home automation and security solutions; a recent study found 66 percent
of domestic smart hubs used to control IoT include Z-Wave [BW15].
Despite being based on International Telecommunications Union's recommenda-
tion for short range narrow-band digital radiocommunication transceivers, the Z-Wave
protocol specications and Software Development Kit (SDK) are only made available
to those who sign a Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA) with the proprietor, Sigma
Designs. The closed nature of the protocol combined with a lack of accessible tools
has limited research into the security of Z-Wave networks. However, the continuing
decrease in cost of SDRs in conjunction with the ongoing development of open source
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software to control them is enabling a wide range of security analyses of wireless
protocols from vehicle key fobs [See14], cellular networks [AKV15], air trac control
signals [CF12], and satellite communications [Moo15]. This research aims to utilize
an open source toolset, presented herein, to identify methods for conducting net-
work reconnaissance, fuzzing, and transceiver ngerprinting of Z-Wave devices and
networks.
1.2 Research Goals
The main goal of this research is to discover and test methods for wirelessly ex-
ploiting Z-Wave networks and devices using SDRs. This research investigates methods
for conducting network discovery and enumeration, cooperative device ngerprinting,
and device status and conguration discovery. This research also aims to identify
anomalous behavior and potential vulnerabilities in Z-Wave devices through fuzzing.
Furthermore, this research seeks to identify physical layer packet manipulations which
discriminate among the three most common Z-Wave transceivers. To accomplish these
goals, a set of SDR-based tools, collectively called EZ-Wave, are developed for Z-Wave
packet capture and injection and used to evaluate Z-Wave networks and devices for
weakness.
1.3 Thesis Layout
This chapter introduces the motivation behind and goals of this research. Chapter
II provides background information on the Z-Wave protocol and summarizes related
research. Chapter III covers the design and implementation of the EZ-Wave toolset.
Chapter IV details the methodology used to design and perform the experiments.
Chapter V presents an analysis of the experiment results. Chapter VI discusses
conclusions drawn from the results and oers suggestions for future research.
2
II. Background and Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
This chapter provides an introduction to the Z-Wave protocol and previous re-
search into Z-Wave Home Area Network (HAN) security. Additionally, related re-
search on protocol fuzzing and radio transceiver ngerprinting techniques are pre-
sented. Section 2.2 describes foundational information required for understanding
how Z-Wave devices communicate. Section 2.3 presents related research that in-
vestigates Z-Wave network exploitation methods. Section 2.4 discusses methods for
protocol and device fuzzing. Section 2.5 describes transceiver ngerprinting tech-
niques.
2.2 Z-Wave Protocol
While Z-Wave is a proprietary protocol, the International Telecommunications
Union Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) species four of seven
total layers of the protocol stack in ITU-T G.9959, Short range narrow-band dig-
ital radiocommunication transceivers - PHY, MAC, SAR and LLC layer specica-
tions [ITU15]. The seven layers, as illustrated in Figure 1, include the Physical
(PHY), Medium Access Control (MAC), Segmentation and Reassembly (SAR), Net-
work Routing (NWK), Encryption (ENC), Logical Link Control (LLC), and Appli-
cation (APP) layers. The implementation of the layers not covered by [ITU15] are
either specied in the closed-sourced SDK protected by an NDA with the Z-Wave
proprietor or left to the discretion of individual device manufacturers. This section
discusses each layer of the protocol stack and presents information critical to this
research.
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Figure 1. Z-Wave Protocol Stack.
*Specied by ITU-T G.9959
2.2.1 PHY Layer.
The PHY layer controls the behavior of Z-Wave radio transceivers, allowing each
device access to the RF spectrum. Z-Wave currently has three PHY layer proles in
the form of the radio congurations detailed in Table 1. In addition to dierences
in the PHY layer, the format of subsequent layers also diers based on the radio
conguration used. For reasons of scope, this research herein focuses solely on the
specications of the R2 prole listed in Table 1.
Illustrated in Figure 2, a Z-Wave PHY frame consists of three components: the
preamble, Start of Frame (SOF), and the PHY Service Data Unit (PSDU). A min-
imum 10 bytes of the binary preamble pattern b01010101 ensures symbol synchro-
nization among transceivers. The SOF delimits the preamble from the PSDU and
must be xFO. Finally, the PSDU is the datagram received from or destined to the
MAC layer and has a maximum length of 64 bytes [ITU15].
2.2.2 MAC Layer.
The MAC layer links network devices by managing HAN domain identication,
node identication, acknowledgement (ACK), error checking, collision avoidance and
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Table 1. Radio Congurations [HRRL16]
Rate 1 (R1) Rate 2 (R2) Rate 3 (R3)
Data rate 9.6 kbps 40kbps 100 kbps
Symbol rate 19.2 kBaud 40 kBaud 100 kBaud
Center frequency* 908.42 MHz 908.40 MHz 916.00 MHz
Modulation FSK FSK GFSK
Coding Manchester NRZ NRZ
Frequency Deviation 20 KHz 20 KHz 29 KHz
*United States center frequencies only
retransmissions [ITU15]. Illustrated in Figure 2, the MAC layer consists of seven
elds: HomeID, Source NodeID, Frame Control, Length, Destination NodeID, MAC
Service Data Unit (MSDU), and Frame Check Sequence (FCS).
The HomeID is a four byte unique domain identier enabling multiple Z-Wave
HANs to operate within RF range of each other. Valid HomeIDs range from x00000000
to xFFFFFFFF with the exception of x54000000 through x55FFFFFF, which are re-
served for beam frame transmissions to wake battery-operated devices.
The Source NodeID (SrcID) is a one-byte unique identier within a given do-
main for the node originating the PSDU. The combination of the HomeID and SrcID
uniquely identify the transmitting node in a multi-domain environment. A Z-Wave
HAN is limited to 232 valid nodes. Valid SrcIDs include x01 through xE8 while the
value x00 is reserved for nodes not yet included into a HAN and values xE9 through
xFF are reserved for unknown use [ITU15].
The Frame Control eld is two bytes and contains control ags as mapped in
Table 2. Of particular interest to this research are the Acknowledgement Required
(ACK Req), Header Type, Sequence Number and two Reserved subelds. Setting the
ACK Req ag indicates the source node requires the destination node to acknowledge
receipt of the frame. The Header Type subeld is four bits in length and denes the
type of frame to be transmitted. Valid values for this subeld include x1 through x3,
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Table 2. Frame Control Subeld [ITU15]
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while [ITU15] lists values x4 through xB as \Not to be used due to backwards com-
patibility and xC through xF as \Reserved". The valid Header Types are Singlecast,
Multicast, and ACK respectively. The Sequence Number subeld is also four bits
with valid values of x0 through xF. However, the Sequence Number is only processed
at the MAC layer when the receiver is sending an ACK or the transmitter is retrans-
mitting a frame which has not been acknowledged. The two Reserved subelds are
each one bit and have an unknown use.
The Length eld indicates the total byte-length of the PSDU. Due to the previ-
ously mentioned maximum length of the PSDU, valid values for this eld are x0A (10
bytes) through x40 (64 bytes).
The Destination NodeID (DstID) identies the intended receiving node of a given
PSDU. It is structured identically to the SrcID with the exception that the DstID
value of xFF represents the broadcast address.
The MSDU eld contains the data received from or intended for the LLC layer
and can vary in length from 0 to 54 bytes. Receiving nodes derive the length of the
MSDU from the Length eld (e.g., Length - 10 bytes).
The MAC layer is concluded with a one-byte non-correcting FCS. The FCS is
calculated using the following algorithm:
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Algorithm 1 Frame Check Sequence Algorithm [ITU15]
procedure BYTE GenerateCheckSum(BYTE *Data, BYTE Length)
BYTE CheckSum = 0xFF






Between the MAC and LLC layers are adaptation layers for handling mesh network
routing (NWK layer), segmentation and reassembly of datagrams (SAR layer), and
encryption (ENC layer). The function of an adaptation layer is triggered by specic
values in the Routed ag of the Frame Control eld or the Command Class eld of
the LLC layer. If no adaptation layer is triggered, the MSDU will be forwarded to the
next layer without modication. This research focuses on Z-Wave communications
which do not include the use of adaptation layers.
2.2.4 LLC and APP Layers.
The LLC layer represents the Data Link Protocol Data Unit (DLPDU) and con-
sists of three elds: Command Class, Command, and DLPDU Payload (Figure 2).
The Command Class eld is one to two bytes and represents a specic group of re-
lated functions supported by a given device. For example, the Command Class Binary
Switch represents a device with two states, ON or OFF. The Command eld represents
one function within the specied Command Class. The Binary Switch Command
Class, for instance, has three supported Commands: SET, GET, and REPORT. Finally,
the DLPDU Payload eld represents the data passed from the APP layer, which in
turn represents a list of parameters to be used in the execution of the Command.
For instance, the DLPDU represented by Binary Switch + SET + ON will change the
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Figure 2. Z-Wave Frame Format [HRRL16].
*Adaptive layers excluded
state of the receiving node to ON. Reference Appendix B for a list of known Command
Classes and associated Commands.
As mentioned in Section 2.2.3, there are special values of the Command Class
eld which trigger Adaptation layers. Specically, the Security Command Class (x98)
triggers the ENC layer, while the Transport Service Command Class (x55) triggers the
SAR layer. Additionally, the 6LoWPAN Command Class (x4F), provides access to a
IPv6 over Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPAN) Data Link Layer Interface
(DLI) rather than the default Z-Wave DLI. This enables an Internet Protocol version
Six (IPv6) network to extend into a Z-Wave HAN so that devices can be addressable
over Internet Protocol (IP) networks. While this feature is promising for future
research, it is not widely supported by Z-Wave devices currently on the market.
While the structure of the LLC layer is specied by [ITU15], the values represent-
ing specic Command Classes and Commands are not. Additionally, the implemen-
tation of the APP layer is left to the device manufacturer, meaning an APP layer
parameter value on one device can have a dierent meaning on another device. In
order to decipher the LLC and APP layer data, security researchers must piece to-
gether bits of information from device manuals, online troubleshooting guides, and
third-party Application Program Interface (API) provided by Z-Wave controller man-
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ufacturers. The ability to capture and analyze live trac signicantly improves the
ability of security researchers to explore the LLC and APP layer data.
2.2.5 Z-Wave System on a Chip.
At the core of every Z-Wave device is an embedded System on a Chip (SoC) which
includes an integrated microcontroller and radio transceiver. Since their introduction
in 2001, Z-Wave SoCs have undergone ve generations of development. A signicant
majority of devices currently commercially available utilize the third generation SoC
(ZW0301) and the fth generation SoC (SD3502). The rst two generation SoCs
have been out of production since 2005 and are excluded from this research. Only
one device with the fourth generation SoC (ZW0401) is identied in the devices
procured for research and thus is under represented. Additionally, this research refers
to specic Z-Wave transceivers by the corresponding SoC designator.
2.3 Related Z-Wave Research
2.3.1 OpenZWave.
OpenZWave is an open source project with the goal to create software libraries
capable of interfacing with selected Universal Serial Bus (USB) Z-Wave controllers
[Ozw15]. The developers of this project have worked to reverse engineer the closed-
source serial API for communicating with the Z-Wave transceiver embedded within
the USB controller. This enables OpenZWave to rely on the transceiver to handle all
PHY and MAC layer communications. The developers have also worked to reverse
engineer and implement at least partial support for 53 Command Classes and 462
Z-Wave devices from 159 manufacturers.
Because OpenZWave relies on actual Z-Wave SoCs, this project can only be used
within the bounds of the PHY and MAC layer specication, thus limiting the bounds
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of its use for security testing of the protocol. However, reviewing the implemen-
tation of the software libraries created from reverse engineering the LLC and APP
layers serves as a solid foundation for this research. Furthermore, the well-maintained
database of Z-Wave devices and associated manufacturer information seeds research
eorts to ngerprint devices.
2.3.2 Z-Force.
Fouladi and Ghanoun present a Z-Wave packet capture and injection tool named
Z-Force and demonstrate the exploitation of a Z-Wave door lock [FG13]. Z-Force
includes a closed-source Microsoft Windows software tool which communicates via
a USB to Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter (UART) bridge with two
Texas Instruments CC1110 radio transceivers running closed-source rmware. Z-
Force is designed to receive and transmit Z-Wave packets on the European center
frequency of 868.40 MHz. The authors investigate the design and implementation
of Z-Wave secure communications through analysis of a door lock rmware binary
and trac captured using Z-Force. The authors discover an implementation aw in
the key exchange process rooted in the lack of state validation leading to the device
overwriting the current shared private key. An attacker using Z-Force to exploit this
vulnerability can reset the established shared private key to a known value enabling
the attacker to issue encrypted yet unauthorized commands.
This work is limited in that it only demonstrates a manufacturer-specic imple-
mentation aw in one device that has not been shown to exist in additional devices.
Furthermore, the closed-source nature of Z-Force has prevented implementation and
extension of the tool.
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2.3.3 Scapy-radio.
The Scapy-radio framework is introduced in [PLD14], wherein the authors seek to
provide a foundation for an extensible, generic wireless monitor and injector. Scapy-
radio is capable of supporting a wide range of wireless protocols as opposed to purpose-
built tools such as RfCat [RfC15], Ubertooth [Ube15], API-Mote [GBM+12, Api15],
and Z-Force [FG13]. Scapy-radio does this by fusing three components: a Univer-
sal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP) B210 SDR, GNU Radio [Gnu15], and Scapy
[Sca15]. The SDR transmits and receives across a large spectrum in order to sup-
port a wide range of wireless protocols with only one piece of hardware. GNU Radio
provides software-based signal processing while Scapy provides packet manipulation
capabilities. GNU Radio and Scapy are discussed in further detail in Sections 3.3 and
3.4.
As shown in Figure 3, the authors extend Scapy by adding a layer, Gnura-
dioPacket, designed to encapsulate subsequent wireless protocol layers. GnuradioPack-
ets are sent to GNU Radio via User Datagram Protocol (UDP) for signal modula-
tion, then to the SDR for transmission. Packet reception follows the reverse of the
described signal ow and enables GnuradioPackets to be processed like any other
protocol in Scapy. The authors demonstrate the capability of Scapy-radio by im-
plementing basic, proof-of-concept implementations for the Z-Wave, Bluetooth 4.0
Low Engery (BT4LE), and IEEE 802.15.4 wireless protocols. This includes signal
processing owgraphs for GNU Radio and Scapy layers to be encapsulated in Gnu-
radioPackets.
The authors demonstrate the potential of Scapy-radio by conducting two tests.
The rst involves a Z-Wave network consisting of a controller, a magnetic window
sensor, and an alarm. The network is congured such that if the window sensor is
open, the controller turns on the alarm. Using Scapy-radio, the authors successfully
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Figure 3. Scapy-radio Architecture [PLD14]. Signals are received by the SDR and processed
by GNU Radio. Resulting packets are processed using Scapy layers specic to the wireless protocol
being monitored. Packet injection follows the reverse ow.
listen for the Z-Wave command to turn the alarm on and immediately inject a packet
containing the command to turn the alarm o, eectively nullifying the original com-
mand.
The second test involves communicating with a BT4LE-enabled e-cigarette. The
authors unsuccessfully attempt to initiate a connection due to the channel hopping
and mandatory response time features of the protocol.
While the proof-of-concept tests are not individually signicant, the Scapy-radio
framework provides robust foundation from which more advanced SDR-based tools
can be developed. Chapter III details how this research modies and extends this
framework in order to accomplish the stated research goals.
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2.3.4 ACK-based Fingerprinting.
The authors of [BFH+15] discuss potential Z-Wave attack classes and explore a
method for distinguishing among devices through passive observation of ACK re-
sponse times. The attack classes discussed include passive network reconnaissance
through packet capture, Denial of Service (DoS) attacks using constant, deceptive, or
reactive jamming techniques, and packet injection attacks such as those discussed in
Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3.
The authors discuss three passive reconnaissance techniques to discriminate among
devices. First, the authors investigate information transmitted during the pairing pro-
cess between a device and controller. Next, trac from Z-Wave controllers is observed.
The authors demonstrate dierent controllers exhibit discernible dierences in how
they interacts with devices. Finally, the authors describe preliminary results of an
ACK-based ngerprinting approach in which mean ACK response times from dier-
ent devices and manufacturers are compared. The results shown in Figure 4 indicate
implementation dierences in ACK handling and transceiver congurations have an
impact on ACK response times and may provide a valid manufacturer ngerprinting
technique.
(a) Devices from two dierent vendors. (b) Devices from same vendor.
Figure 4. Mean ACK response times (n=70, 99% CI) [BFH+15]
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2.3.5 Rogue Controller Injection.
The authors of [FR15] present a method for gaining persistent control of a Z-Wave
HAN by conspicuously adding a rogue controller. This work successfully demonstrates
this attack on the three common Z-Wave gateways seen in Figure 5. The attack relies
on gaining temporary access to an IP network in which a Z-Wave gateway device re-
sides. A Z-Wave gateway bridges IP and Z-Wave networks to enable easy user control
through a web user interface. HTTP trac generated by interaction with the user
interface is translated into Z-Wave commands used to control devices on the HAN.
Using an HTTP replay attack, the authors successfully include a rogue controller
into the target Z-Wave HAN. The rogue device is capable of controlling all devices
within the HAN with the exception of those requiring encrypted communications.
The attack is concluded by removing evidence of the rogue controller from the user
interface and log les to reduce the likelihood of discovery.
This technique demonstrates the lack of source authentication in the Z-Wave pro-
tocol, enabling any device to inject commands into a HAN once the HomeID is known.
Figure 5. Gateway devices: (a) RaZberry Pi, (b) VeraEdge, and (c) Almond+ [FR15].
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2.3.6 Wireless Intrusion Detection.
The authors of [FRPR16] present a technique for hiding information within Z-
Wave frames and propose a Misuse-based Intrusion Detection System (MBIDS). They
demonstrate the information hiding technique by conducting a covert channel attack
where dormant malicious software residing on the Z-Wave gateway is activated by a
specially crafted Z-Wave transmission. Once activated, the malicious software initi-
ates a reverse shell to a remote location, giving an attacker a foothold into the target
local area network. This technique relies on the gateway accepting spoofed Z-Wave
frames containing APP-layer parameters beyond those required by the specic Com-
mand Class. For example, the Binary Switch Command Class requires, at most, a
one-byte-APP layer parameter, but a frame containing additional bytes is accepted
as valid given the Length and FCS elds are correct. This allows up to 53 bytes
of information to be hidden within the APP layer of a Z-Wave frame. By inspect-
ing received frames, malicious software can remain dormant until a hidden trigger is
received.
As a mitigation strategy, the authors design an MBIDS solution. The MBIDS
utilizes Scapy-radio (Section 2.3.3) with a USRP to capture the trac of a Z-Wave
HAN and inspect each frame. A whitelist of known-good eld values is used to detect
packet manipulation attacks with 92% mean accuracy. Being a proof of concept,
the presented MBIDS is a minimal implementation only supporting 10 Command
Classes. Additionally, an exhaustive implementation of the proposed MBIDS is not
feasible due to the wide range of manufacturer-specic implementations of the APP
layer. Furthermore, while the MBIDS seeks to detect manipulated frames, it is unable
to distinguish between frames transmitted by a member of the Z-Wave HAN and
properly formed frames injected for network reconnaissance purposes.
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2.4 Related Fuzzing Research
Fuzzing is a software testing method that feeds a program, device, or system
with malformed, unexpected, or random input data to nd critical crash-level defects
[Tak09]. The authors of [LBF12] present a framework for discovering vulnerabilities,
via fuzzing, in the implementation of 6LoWPAN in IEEE 802.15.4 devices. While
this work focuses solely on 6LoWPAN over IEEE 802.15.4, it outlines a methodology
that can be applied when fuzzing other WSN protocols.
The framework, depicted in Figure 6, consists of a library of pre-dened interac-
tion scenarios, a fuzzing engine, and the target IoT device. Each interaction scenario
is an ordered sequence of packets that specify messages to be sent and the expected
responses. The fuzzing engine takes a given scenario as input and randomly mutates
one or more eld values of a specic message using the packet manipulation capa-
bilities of Scapy [Sca15]. The scenario is then executed while device responses are
compared to those specied in the scenario. If the device becomes non-responsive, a
vulnerability has been reached and exploited.
Figure 6. 6LoWPAN fuzzing framework [LBF12].
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2.5 Related Transceiver Fingerprinting Research
Recent works investigate ngerprinting techniques to accurately verify wireless
transceivers. These techniques fall into two general categories: RF ngerprinting and
PHY manipulation.
The rst category uses statistical comparisons between observed spectral features
of a given transceiver and RF ngerprint models derived from training sets to classify
a device. Several works investigate RF ngerprinting of transceivers used in WSNs
[RC07], particularly IEEE 802.15.4 transceivers [DC09, RTM12, PTBR14] and IEEE
802.11 [BBGO08]. More recently, preliminary results applying RF ngerprinting tech-
niques to Z-Wave transceivers are promising [BBTR15, PR15]. However, key limita-
tions of traditional RF ngerprinting techniques are that they require training and
management of RF ngerprint models and sophisticated signal measurement hard-
ware that is orders of magnitude more costly than the transceivers overseen. The
resultant RF ngerprint database is also specic to a particular collection of devices
in a single environment.
In contrast, PHY manipulation techniques exploit transceiver design characteris-
tics that are invariant with respect to the environment. Instead of training sets and
feature selections, PHY manipulation techniques only rely on whether or not the de-
vice under test transmits a reply. Furthermore, PHY preamble manipulation requires
no signal measurement hardware and can be performed with commodity radios or low-
cost SDRs. Jenkins et al. demonstrate that IEEE 802.15.4 frames with non-standard
PHY headers can be used to ngerprint transceivers [JSB+14]. This work is extended
in [RMTG15] and applied towards PHY-augmented device authentication, wireless
intrusion detection, and remote device type ngerprinting. The authors demonstrate
the ability to accurately classify eight IEEE 802.15.4 devices using the decision tree
depicted in Figure 7. Successful classication is done with, at most, eight packets by
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Figure 7. Example classication decision tree for IEEE 802.15.4 transceivers. The
three devices in the lower left share a common radio core designed by Ember and are therefore
indistinguishable using preamble manipulation techniques. [RMTG15].
exploiting the response rate of each device when a packet with a specic PHY header
manipulation is transmitted.
Similar techniques are applied to IEEE 802.11b transceivers in [KRM14], where
the length of a PHY preamble is repeatedly shortened in length until the target
transceiver no longer responds. Figure 8 compares the dierent response rates of two
transceivers when preamble length is varied. Figure 8a suggests the Atheros AR928X
transceiver is not capable of receiving packets with preambles shorter then 125 bits.
Figure 8b suggests the Intel 4965AG transceiver is capable of receiving packets the
previous transceiver cannot. Therefore, packets with a preamble length of 124 bits can
be used to discriminate between the two transceivers. Exploiting these dierences in
transceiver reception capability provides the foundation for ngerprinting transceivers
via PHY manipulations.
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(a) Atheros AR928X transceiver. (b) Intel 4965AG transceiver.
Figure 8. Packet reception versus preamble length (99% CI) [KRM14]
Most recently, Ramsey et. al. [RFB16] apply this technique to 5 GHz IEEE
802.11a and IEEE 802.11ac wireless transceivers. The authors demonstrate that
preamble manipulation can be used to discern among six transceiver designs with
greater than 99% accuracy using fewer than 20 packets.
2.6 Conclusion
The security of wireless protocols such as IEEE 802.15.4 and IEEE 802.11 have
been studied at length. However, little research has been published to evaluate the
Z-Wave protocol beyond passive sning and packet replay. This thesis expands upon
the current body of Z-Wave research by investigating methods for conducting network
reconnaissance, discovering device vulnerabilities through fuzzing, and ngerprinting
transceivers via PHY manipulation.
19
III. System Design and Architecture
3.1 Introduction
To accomplish the goals of this research, a system is rst designed for quickly pro-
totyping and testing tools capable of interacting with Z-Wave networks and devices in
specic ways. This system, referred to as EZ-Wave, is an extension of the Scapy-radio
framework presented in Section 2.3.3. This chapter presents the design and architec-
ture of the EZ-Wave system, as seen in Figure 9, by discussing the implementation of
each component. Section 3.2 discusses the role, use, and current limitations of SDRs
in EZ-Wave. Section 3.3 describes the implementation of signal ow and processing
for receiving and transmitting Z-Wave PHY frames through GNU Radio. Section 3.4
presents the work done to extend support of the Z-Wave protocol through the Scapy
framework.
Figure 9. EZ-Wave Architecture.
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3.2 Software-Dened Radio
The Federal Communications Commission denes an SDR as a radio that includes
a transceiver in which the frequency range, modulation type, maximum output power
or the circumstances under which it transmits and receives can be altered by making
changes in software [FCC15]. EZ-Wave relies on SDRs to replace the PHY layer
functionality of proprietary Z-Wave transceivers. EZ-Wave is designed to work with
multiple SDRs, including the USRP B210, BladeRF, and HackRF One (henceforth
HackRF), through pre-built signal ow software (see Section 3.3). While the three
aforementioned SDRs have been tested with the EZ-Wave system, for consistency, this
research uses only the HackRF (Figure 10). The HackRF was chosen to demonstrate
functionality while using minimum cost components.
The HackRF is an open source hardware platform including a half-duplex transceiver
operating between 1 MHz and 6 GHz with 2M to 20M samples per second (sps). To ac-
complish full duplex communication, two HackRFs with rmware version git-f83fc14
dated 09/09/2015 and VERT900 +3dBi antennas are used. The SDRs connect to a
host computer via USB where the behavior of each is dened in software discussed in
Section 3.3.
Figure 10. HackRF One Software-Dened Radio.
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This design, however, introduces one major limitation: the inability to conduct a
Clear Channel Assessment (CCA). CCA occurs prior to transmission to detect if other
devices are currently transmitting and is essential for optimal performance of wireless
networks [RR06]. Without CCA, one must be cognizant to minimize transmission
time in order to refrain from corrupting in-ight frames or preventing other devices
from transmitting.
3.3 GNU Radio
GNU Radio is a free software development toolkit that provides signal processing
runtime and processing blocks to implement SDRs. In conjunction with the graphical
interface, GRC, GNU Radio simplies the creation of signal ow graphs and the gen-
eration of ow graph source code. GNU Radio is widely used in hobbyist, academic
and commercial environments supporting wireless communications research and im-
plementation of real-world radio systems [Gnu15]. This research uses GNU Radio
software version 3.7.7.1. Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 detail the GRC owgraphs for the
receiving and transmitting SDRs respectively. Reference Appendix C for the source
code of both owgraphs and all conguration settings.
3.3.1 Receiver.
Figure 11 illustrates the signal ow and processing blocks of the receiving SDR.
The osmocom Source block controls the behavior of the HackRF by setting the sample
rate, center frequency, and gain settings. The minimum supported sample rate of the
HackRF, 2 Msps, is chosen to minimize host Central Processing Unit (CPU) workload
and because said sample rate is an even multiple of the Z-Wave R2 symbol rate of 40
kBaud (Table 1).
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Figure 11. Receiver Signal Flowgraph.
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The center frequency is set to 908.48 MHz by shifting the specied Z-Wave center
frequency (Table 1) +80 KHz to oset the presence of an artifact from the Direct
Current (DC) voltage of the analog to digital converter when the signal is down
converted, known as a DC spike. This initial shift in center frequency will place the
DC spike outside the bandwith of the Z-Wave signal being received. The gain settings
are variable and controlled by the user through a graphical interface during runtime.
The Frequency Xlating (translating) Finite Impulse Response (FIR) Filter block
shifts the center frequency back to the desired 908.40 MHz and applies an initial low-
pass lter. The Simple Squelch and Low-Pass Filter blocks further lter the received
signal. The Quadrature Demod block demodulates the RF signal by obtaining the
in-phase and quadrature-phase components using the quadrature sampling technique
[TC05]. The signal is then phase-aligned using the Clock Recovery MM block, which
outputs individual samples centered on the corresponding symbol. This block also
decimates, or reduces the sample rate of, the signal by a factor of 50 in order to match
the desired symbol rate of 40 kBaud (Table 1). The Binary Slicer block converts the
stream of samples to a bitstream. Finally, the Packet sink parses the bitstream into
Z-Wave MAC frames by searching for the preamble bit pattern and SOF delimiter,
as described in Section 2.2, and subsequently encapsulates the MAC frame within a
GnuradioPacket as described in Section 2.3.3. The resulting GnuradioPacket is then
encapsulated within a UDP packet and sent to the Localhost interface, port 52002,
for processing (described in Section 3.4).
3.3.2 Transmitter.
Figure 12 illustrates the signal ow and processing blocks of the transmitting SDR.
The owgraph begins with the Socket PDU block, which represents a UDP server
listening on the Localhost interface, port 52001.
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Figure 12. Transmitter Signal Flowgraph.
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The UDP payload received on this port is expected to represent the Z-Wave MAC
frame to be transmitted. However, conformance to the Z-Wave MAC specication
(Section 2.2.2) is not validated or enforced in order to allow for transmission of mal-
formed frames. The Preamble block prepends a preamble and SOF delimiter to the
MAC frame. This block allows for a variable length preamble to be dened by the user
through an XMLRPC call during runtime. The PDU to Tagged Stream calculates the
actual length of the entire PHY frame and converts the frame to a bitstream. The
bitstream is then bitwise XOR'd with b1 by the Not block. This is done because the
symbol mapping of the Gaussian Frequency Shift Keying (GFSK) Mod block used
for modulation is opposite of the symbol mapping specied in [ITU15] as depicted in
Table 3.
Because GNU Radio does not have a standard Frequency Shift Keying (FSK)
block, modulation of the bitstream is handled by the GFSK block. GFSK is a form of
FSK where a Gaussian pulse-shaping lter is applied to smooth frequency transitions.
The BT parameter of this block represents the product of the -3 dB bandwith of the
Gaussian lter (B) and the bit period of the input stream (Tb) and is the main char-
acteristic of the Gaussian lter [SHM09]. Setting the BT parameter to the maximum
value of 1 eectively minimizes the response of the Gaussian lter leaving a standard
FSK rectangular pulse shape [KPMR98] as depicted in Figure 13.
Table 3. Symbol Mapping Comparison
Symbol Z-Wave GFSK Block
0 fcenterfrequency + deviation fcenterfrequency - deviation
1 fcenterfrequency - deviation fcenterfrequency + deviation
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Figure 13. Gaussian Pulse Shape for Three BTb Products.
Once modulated, the signal is attenuated by 10% to avoid clipping, or overloading,
the transmitter and then resampled at a rate of 250:1. This resample rate is calculated




Finally, the osmocom Sink block controls the behavior of the HackRF by setting
the sample rate, center frequency, and gain settings. The maximum supported sample
rate of 20 Msps is used as well as the Z-Wave center frequency of 908.40 MHz. The
gain settings are variable and controlled by the user through a graphical interface
during runtime.
3.4 Scapy
Scapy is an extensible Python-based framework for crafting and transmitting ar-
bitrary packets. It can be used to capture, decode, and reply to a wide range of
network protocols [Sca15]. Additionally, Scapy provides the capability to generate
and send malformed packets, which proves useful for security research. This section
describes the extensions of the Scapy framework used in the EZ-Wave system. Sec-
tion 3.4.1 describes the implementation of additional Scapy layers required to support
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the Z-Wave protocol. Section 3.4.2 describes the module which handles processing of
the aforementioned layers. Section 3.4.3 presents the network automata created to
handle bi-directional communication with Z-Wave devices.
3.4.1 Layers.
Communication between EZ-Wave and GNU Radio relies on the encapsulation of
ve layers implemented via Scapy as illustrated in Figure 14. Messages are trans-
ported between EZ-Wave and GNU Radio using standard UDP packets as structured
in Table 4. Encapsulated within each UDP packet is a Gnuradio packet, which is
created through the addition of the Scapy layer Gnuradio. This layer encapsulates
the MAC frame of a supported wireless protocol by prepending an eight-byte header
identifying the protocol in use. For the purposes of this research, only the header
value x0100000000000000 is of interest, as it identies the encapsulated protocol as
Z-Wave. While the Gnuradio layer remains unchanged from the Scapy-radio imple-
mentation [PLD14], adding support for additional Z-Wave radio congurations (as
discussed in Section 2.2.1) can be accomplished by binding a unique Gnuradio packet
header value to each prole.
Figure 14. Scapy Layers. Implementation of the Z-Wave frame format (Figure 2) using Scapy.
The ZWave packet is encapsulated within a Gnuradio packet and transmitted via UDP.
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Table 4. EZ-Wave Packet Structure
Byte 0 Byte 1 Byte 2 Byte 3





SrcID Frame Ctrl* Length
DstID Command Class Command Parameters
:
Parameters FCS
* Frame Ctrl subelds are shown in Table 2
UDP Packet Gnuradio Packet ZWave Packet
CommandClass Packet Raw Data
A ZWave packet representing a Z-Wave MAC frame (Figure 14) is encapsulated
within a Gnuradio packet. ZWave packets are created through the implementation
of the ZWave Scapy layer. While Picod et al. present a basic implementation of the
ZWave layer in [PLD14], EZ-Wave utilizes a restructured, modular implementation
allowing for future support of additional Z-Wave radio congurations. This layer
enables the EZ-Wave user to specify the value of any eld within the Z-Wave MAC
frame (Section 2.2.2) with the exception of MSDU and the FCS. The MSDU is added
through a lower Scapy layer representing a specic Command Class, while the FCS
is calculated automatically after the entire ZWave packet is constructed. The ability
to specify the value of any eld within the Z-Wave MAC frame enables the EZ-Wave
user to test how Z-Wave devices handle frames that do not conform to the ITU-
T G.9959 specication. Examples of potential testing scenarios include observing
Z-Wave device behavior when receiving a frame with:
 a SrcID of a node that does not exist
 a Length value that does not match the actual frame length
 a Length value above the maximum value of 64
 Reserved ags within the Frame Control eld are set
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Encapsulated within the ZWave packet is a CommandClass packet representing
the Z-Wave LLC layer (Section 2.2.4). Currently, EZ-Wave implements 30 dierent
Command Classes via Scapy layers (see Appendix B), compared to the three Com-
mand Classes implemented in [PLD14]. Any one of these layers can be invoked when
crafting a Z-Wave frame in order to specify a desired Command Class and associated
Command. The nal layer is a Scapy RAW layer (the data eld of a packet with no
lower layers) representing the Z-Wave APP layer. As discussed in Section 2.2.4, the
APP layer is simply a variable length list of parameters to be used by the Command
Class and Command.
3.4.2 Modules.
Critical to EZ-Waze functionality is the Gnuradio module presented in [PLD14].
This module is responsible for the mechanisms necessary for processing communica-
tions between EZ-Wave and GNU Radio. Most importantly, this module starts the
appropriate GNU Radio owgraph as a background process, eliminating the need for
a manual start by the user. It implements the GnuradioSocket discussed in Section
2.3.3 and denes the functionality for sending and receiving packets through said
socket. The Gnuradio module also facilitates the XMLRPC communications used to
dynamically modify owgraph variables, such as the preamble length as discussed in
Section 3.3. Furthermore, error handling and clean process termination are handled
by the Gnuradio module.
3.4.3 Automata.
To handle bidirectional communications between EZ-Wave and Z-Wave devices,
the Scapy Automaton class is extended to create a ZWaveAutomaton, illustrated as a
nite state machine in Figure 15. The ZWaveAutomaton is used to send a command
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to a Z-Wave device, capture the corresponding response, and return the APP layer
data to the calling function. The automaton is rst initialized and the Z-Wave frame
to be transmitted is passed. The BEGIN state initializes Scapy-radio, transmits the
frame, and transitions to the WAIT state. During the WAIT state, each received
frame is inspected. If the received frame is a valid response to the transmitted frame,
the automaton transitions to the END state and the response is returned to the caller
for further processing. If no valid responses are received over the span of two seconds,
the initial frame is retransmitted. The ERR state is reached after a maximum of
three timeouts. At this point, it is assumed the target device is not responding and
a NULL response is returned to the calling function.
An example use of the ZWaveAutomaton is to query the state of a binary switch
device. A Z-Wave frame representing the BinarySwitchGet command is passed to an
instance of the ZWaveAutomaton upon initialization. The automaton transmits the
frame, inspect subsequently received frames for the corresponding BinarySwitchRe-
port frame, and return the APP layer data (in this example, a value representing











This chapter presents the system design and architecture of EZ-Wave. Using EZ-
Wave, Python-based tools can be quickly developed for testing Z-Wave networks and
devices for vulnerabilities using SDRs. This research relies on EZ-Wave to accomplish




This chapter presents the methodologies used to design and conduct the experi-
ments required to accomplish the research goals. Section 4.2 discusses the problem
denition, including the goals and approaches taken to accomplish each. Section 4.3
presents the design of experiments, including testbed congurations and evaluation
techniques for each experiment.
4.2 Problem Denition
4.2.1 Goals.
This research conducts a total of four experiments to address three primary re-
search goals:
Goal 1. Identify methods for conducting active network reconnaissance against
Z-Wave HANs, including network enumeration, cooperative device ngerprinting, and
device status and conguration discovery.
Goal 2. Identify vulnerabilities, through fuzzing, in Z-Wave devices resulting
in anomalous behavior.
Goal 3. Identify PHY preamble manipulations to enable discrimination among
Z-Wave SoCs.
4.2.2 Approach.
Each aforementioned goal requires separate approaches. The following sections
describe the logical approach taken to accomplish each goal.
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4.2.2.1 Goal 1.
The current body of Z-Wave research is limited to network discovery [BFH+15] and
packet replay [PLD14]. It is hypothesized the injection of specically-crafted frames
will enable more sophisticated network reconnaissance. Specically, combining the
lack of source authentication with knowledge gained from reverse engineering the Z-
Wave protocol will lead to successfully soliciting information from a target network.
Such information includes the existence of nodes in the network (enumeration) and the
device type, software versions, operational status, and conguration settings of each
node. To accomplish this goal, specic frames are injected into a Z-Wave network,
corresponding responses are captured, and each response is analyzed.
4.2.2.2 Goal 2.
Prior to the work herein, no method for systematically testing how Z-Wave devices
respond to malformed frames have been established. It is hypothesized that observing
device behavior under these conditions may lead to the discovery of vulnerabilities,
undocumented features, or uniquely identifying characteristics. To accomplish this
goal, multiple Z-Wave devices are fuzzed and the resulting behavior is observed in
search of specic frame malformations that cause the target device to behave unex-
pectedly.
4.2.2.3 Goal 3.
Previous work demonstrates PHY preamble manipulation as an eective transceiver
ngerprinting technique for IEEE 802.15.4 transceivers [JSB+14, RMTG15] and IEEE
802.11b transceivers [KRM14]. It is hypothesized that preamble manipulation may
also prove an eective method to discriminate among Z-Wave transceivers. To ac-
complish this goal, Z-Wave devices with dierent SoCs are tested by targeting each
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with frames of varying preamble lengths and comparing corresponding response rates
in search of statistically signicant dierences in transceiver capability.
4.3 Experiment Design
To accomplish the stated research goals, two testbeds are created to facilitate a
total of four experiments, as illustrated in Table 5. Section 4.3.1 details each testbed.
Section 4.3.2 details Experiment 1: Practical Network Reconnaissance. Section 4.3.3
details Experiment 2: Fuzzing. Section 4.3.4 details Experiment 3: Transceiver Fin-
gerprinting. Section 4.3.5 details Experiment 4: Practical Transceiver Fingerprinting.
4.3.1 Testbed Congurations.
For this research, it is necessary to implement two separate testbeds, each to be
used in multiple experiments.
4.3.1.1 Testbed 1 - Ideal Environment.
Testbed 1 represents an ideal testing environment designed to test only one Z-
Wave device at a time, at short range, in order to minimize interference from other






















devices. The testbed consists of two major components: EZ-Wave, congured with
two HackRF SDRs, and the Z-Wave device under test. This testbed, as illustrated
in Figure 16, enables experiments where physical access to the device under test is
required or experiments which test the initial feasibility of a specic technique.
EZ-Wave is congured on an HP EliteBook 8570W with 16 GB of RAM and
an Intel i7-3720QM CPU running Ubuntu 14.04. Two HackRFs are used as the
transmitting and receiving SDRs and are congured as discussed in Sections 3.2 and
3.3.
The Z-Wave device under test is rst included into a Z-Wave HAN in order for
the device to receive a known HomeID and NodeID from the controller. The entire
Z-Wave HAN is then powered o, with the exception of the device under test, so no
other Z-Wave devices are present during the experiment. Finally, the device under
test is situated one meter from both the transmitting and receiving HackRFs.
Figure 16. Testbed 1 Conguration.
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4.3.1.2 Testbed 2 - Practical Environment.
Testbed 2 is designed to replicate a practical Z-Wave HAN and enables testing at
a distance reasonable for an attacker. This testbed, illustrated in Figure 17, consists
of two major components: EZ-Wave and the Z-Wave HAN under test.
EZ-Wave is again congured on an HP EliteBook 8570W with 16 GB of RAM
and an Intel i7-3720QM CPU running Ubuntu 14.04. Two HackRFs are used as
the transmitting and receiving SDRs and are congured as discussed in Sections 3.2
and 3.3 with the exception of the gain settings for each. The Baseband (BB) and
Intermediate Frequency (IF) Gain settings of the receiver are increased to 40 dB each
Figure 17. Testbed 2 Conguration. A Z-Wave HAN containing 15 devices. Device numbers
correspond with Table 6
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while the IF gain of the transmitter is increased to 32 dB. Increasing the gain settings
allow the receiver and transmitter to operate at distances farther than those described
in Section 4.3.1.1. EZ-Wave is placed inside a vehicle parked directly across the street
from the house at a distance of 20 m from the front door. Both SDRs are positioned
at vehicle window-height and the vehicle windows are in the down position.
The Z-Wave HAN consists of 15 devices: one primary controller, two secondary
controllers, and 12 end devices. The devices listed in Table 6 are detailed in Appendix
A. All devices are rst included into the Z-Wave HAN while maintaining default
settings, then tested for proper functionality via the web user interface of the primary
controller.
Table 6. Testbed 2 Devices.
Device Manufacturer Device Name
Dev1 Vera VeraEdge
Dev2 Aeotec Smart Switch 6
Dev3 LinearLinc LED Light Bulb
Dev4 Aeotec LED Light Bulb
Dev5 SmartThings SmartThings Hub
Dev6 Aeotec Smart Energy Switch
Dev7 Everspring Lamp Socket
Dev8 Fortrezz Water Valve
Dev9 GE Outdoor Appliance Module
Dev10 Aeotec Siren Gen5
Dev11 NuTone Smart LED Light Bulb
Dev12 RaZberry Pi RaZberry Pi
Dev13 Fortrezz Siren/Strobe Alarm
Dev14 Everspring Appliance Module
Dev15 GE Lamp Module
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Finally, every experiment using this testbed assumes the HomeID has already
been identied through passive scanning as discussed in Section 2.3.3. The HomeID
of the Z-Wave HAN is xE1453473.
4.3.2 Experiment 1: Practical Network Reconnaissance.
This experiment is designed to identify methods for conducting active network
reconnaissance against a Z-Wave HAN. Using Testbed 2 (Section 4.3.1.2), frames are
crafted and injected into the Z-Wave HAN with the intent to collect the following
information:
 Network Enumeration: NodeIDs for Z-Wave devices included in the HAN.
 Device Interrogation:
{ Device manufacturer and device type
{ Software version
{ Supported Command Classes
{ Operational status
{ Conguration settings
Combining information from a review of the protocol specication (Section 2.2),
related works such as OpenZWave (Section 2.3.1) and Scapy radio (Section 2.3.3),
and trac analysis the following methods are tested:
4.3.2.1 Network Enumeration.
The transmission of a frame with the ACK Req ag set will result in a compulsory
ACK from the target node [ITU15]. Thus, transmitting such a frame to the broadcast
DstID of a Z-Wave HAN (Section 2.2.2) will result in ACKs from every node within
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range of the transmitter. Using this information, the frame depicted in Figure 18 is
crafted.
The SrcID is set to x01 to spoof the SrcID of the primary controller. The ACK
Req ag is represented by setting the most signicant nibble of the Frame Control
eld to x4 (Table 2). The remainder of the Frame Control eld represents a sin-
glecast frame with a sequence number of x01 [ITU15]. The Len and FCS elds are
set in accordance with the specication (Section 2.2.2). The DstID eld is set to the
broadcast address (xFF) as previously discussed. The NoOperation Command Class
(x00) is used to ensure no action is taken by devices in the target Z-Wave HAN except
for the compulsory ACK.
This frame is transmitted via EZ-Wave, the resulting ACKs are captured, and
unique SrcIDs are recorded. This process is repeated ve times, in order to mitigate
the potential for missed ACKs due to collisions within the wireless medium. Finally,
unique SrcIDs from across each test are consolidated to provide a list of devices
included in the Z-Wave HAN.
4.3.2.2 Device Interrogation.
Due to the lack of source authentication for unencrypted trac in the Z-Wave
protocol, target nodes respond to a properly formed frame injected via EZ-Wave the
same as it would a frame transmitted by the HAN controller. Using knowledge of Z-
Wave Command Classes and Commands (Appendix B), the frames listed in Figure 19,
each containing LLC/APP layer payloads representing specic requests, are injected
into the Z-Wave HAN.
Figure 18. Frame Crafted to Enumerate a Z-Wave HAN.
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The frame payload in Figure 19a represents the ManufacturerSpecic Get Com-
mand Class and Command combination. The expected response is a Manufactur-
erSpecic Report where the APP layer parameters correlate to a manufacturer iden-
tication number, product type, and product identication number. Referencing the
OpenZWave device database discussed in Section 2.3.1, these parameters can be con-
verted into a human-readable manufacturer name and device type.
Similarly, the payload in Figure 19b represents the Version Get Command Class
and Command combination. The expected response is a Version Report where the
APP layer parameters correlate to ve values: Z-Wave library type, Z-Wave proto-
(a) Device Manufacturer and Device Type Request.
(b) Request for Device Software Version.
(c) Request for Supported Command Class.
(d) Request for Basic Operational Status.
(e) Request for Conguration Settings.
Figure 19. Frames Crafted to Interrogated a Z-Wave Device.
* DstID chosen from list of known NodeIDs after network enumeration.
** FCS calculated after all other elds are set.
*** : 1-byte variable parameter 2 fx00:xFFg.
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col version, Z-Wave protocol sub-version, application version, and application sub-
version.
The payload in Figure 19c represents the Node Information Frame (NIF) Request.
The expected NIF received in response contains a list of supported Command Classes
among other device information.
The payload in Figure 19d represents the Basic Get Command Class/Command
combination. The expected response is a Basic Report where the APP layer param-
eters correlate to the status of the most basic function of the target device. It is
important to note the Basic Command Class can be replaced by other supported
Command Classes in order to get more specic status information.
Finally, the payload in Figure 19e represents the Conguration Get Command
Class/ Command combination. This request requires a one-byte parameter corre-
sponding to a unique congurable setting. The relationship between the parameter
value and the setting it represents is determined by the device manufacturer and is
largely unknown for any given device (Section 2.2.4). Additionally, a Z-Wave device
may have several congurable settings. Therefore, this frame is repeatedly transmit-
ted while the third byte of the payload is iterated from x00 to xFF. If a parameter
value is valid for the target node, the device is expected to respond with a Congu-
ration Report where the APP layer parameters correlate to the current conguration
of the specied setting.
Iterating through all NodeIDs identied during Network Enumeration (Section
4.3.2.1), each frame depicted in Figure 19 is transmitted via EZ-Wave. The cor-
responding responses are captured and analyzed, leading to a prole of the target
Z-Wave HAN.
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4.3.3 Experiment 2: Fuzzing.
This experiment is designed to test for and discover Z-Wave device vulnerabilities
via fuzzing. Using Testbed 1 (Section 4.3.1.1) and the fuzzing framework depicted in
Figure 20, three from Table 6 are individually fuzzed and observed for unexpected
behavior. Dev4, Dev13, and Dev15 are chosen in order to represent three dierent
manufacturers.
The fuzzing framework, modeled after the framework presented in [LBF12], con-
sists of three main components: scenarios, the fuzzing engine, and the device under
test. A scenario describes a sequence of legitimate message transactions between a
Z-Wave controller and the device under test. Each scenario consists of four general
components: initial setup, test message, status check, and device reset. The initial
setup veries the device under test is present and responsive. The test message in-
cludes the frame to be fuzzed and the boundaries within which fuzzing will occur.
The status check queries the device under test to determine if it remains responsive
after the fuzzed message is processed. Finally, the device is reset to the pre-test
conguration.
The fuzzing engine is responsible for applying a mutation algorithm to the test
message and executing the sequence of messages described by the given scenario. The
Figure 20. Z-Wave Fuzzing Framework
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mutation algorithm randomly selects, within the scenario boundaries, which elds to
mutate. Once elds are selected, a random, invalid value is generated for each. For
example, the maximum valid length of a frame is 64 bytes (Section 2.2.2); therefore
if the Len eld is selected for mutation, only values >64 bytes are generated. The
fuzzing engine then utilizes EZ-Wave to execute the scenario. Finally, the device
under test is one of the three devices previously listed setup in Testbed 1 with default
congurations.
There are more than 2512 possible Z-Wave frames. At a notional rate of one per
second, it would take more than 4  10146 years to test each. Therefore, limiting
the scope of fuzzing and randomly sampling within said scope is required. This
experiment limits the scope of testing in three ways:
 Only two scenarios are tested per device
 Within each scenario, only specic elds of the test message are subject to
random selection for mutation
 When a eld is selected for mutation, random values are generated while ex-
cluding the range of known valid values
4.3.3.1 Scenario 1.
Depicted in Figure 21, Scenario 1 is designed to fuzz portions of the MAC layer
processing within the device under test. The scenario limits the scope of fuzzing to the
SrcID, Header Type, and Len elds. One or more of these elds are randomly selected
for mutation by the fuzzing engine. As discussed in Section 2.2.2, SrcID values xE9-
xFE are reserved for unknown use, Header Type values x04-xFF are not to be used
or reserved, and Len values >64 are invalid. For each eld selected for mutation,
the fuzzing engine generates a random value from within the range of invalid values
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identied. The scenario is then executed using the mutated frame, representing one
test.
It is expected that any device receiving a frame with invalid values in the MAC
header will take no action, yet remain responsive to subsequent valid frames. There-
fore, the observation of any action taken by the device under test in response to
the test message signies unexpected behavior. Additionally, if the device under test
becomes unresponsive to subsequent valid frames, a vulnerability has been discovered.
(a) Message Flow. Initial Setup ensures the device is present and responsive. The
Test Message is the message to be fuzzed. The Status Check determines if the device
remains responsive and if the Test Message was executed. Finally, the device is reset for
the subsequent tests.
(b) Scenario 1 Test Message. Fuzzing is limited to the SrcID, Header Type (second
most signicant nibble of FrameCtrl), and Len elds.
*DstID is set to the known DstID of the device under test.
**FCS is calculated after all other elds are set, in accordance with [ITU15].
Figure 21. Scenario 1
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Due to the scope limitations, the total possible combinations is reduced to ap-
proximately 65 thousand, or approximately 216. This fuzzing experiment randomly
samples and tests 500 of those combinations.
4.3.3.2 Scenario 2.
Depicted in Figure 22, Scenario 2 is designed to fuzz a portion of the APP layer
processing within the device under test. The scenario limits the scope of fuzzing to
the parameters of the Conguration Set Command Class and Command combination.
As discussed in Section 2.2.4, the APP layer is a variable length list of parameters
to be used in the execution of the Command whose implementation is left to the
manufacturer and varies among devices. To further limit the scope, the maximum
length of the parameters is reduced from 52 bytes to six bytes.
To mutate the test message, the fuzzing engine rst generates a random length
between one and six bytes. Then a random value is generated for each byte. The
scenario is then executed using the mutated frame, representing one test.
It is expected that any device receiving invalid conguration parameters will ac-
knowledge receipt of the frame and take no further action while valid conguration
parameters will be applied. This is tested utilizing the message ow illustrated in
Figure 22a and comparing the conguration setting prior to the test message with
the same setting after the test message. Due to manufacturer-specic implemen-
tations of the APP layer, valid conguration parameters remain largely unknown.
Therefore, if the device under test successfully applies the conguration parameters
while remaining responsive to subsequent valid frames, it is assumed the parameters
were indeed valid. If the conguration parameters are not applied yet the device un-
der test remains responsive to subsequent valid frames, the invalid parameters have
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(a) Message Flow. Initial Setup ensures the device is present and responsive while saving
the current conguration setting (if applicable). The Test Message is the message to be
fuzzed. The Status Check determines if the device remains responsive and if the Test
Message was executed. Finally, the device is reset for the subsequent tests
(b) Scenario 2 Test Message. Fuzzing is limited to the parameters of the CONFIGU-
RATION SET Command with a maximum length of th six bytes.
*DstID is set to the know 5n DstID of the device under test.
**FCS is calculated after all other elds are set in accordance with [ITU15].
Figure 22. Scenario 2
been handled properly. However, if the device under test becomes unresponsive to
subsequent valid frames, a vulnerability has been discovered.
Due to the scope limitations, the total possible combinations is reduced to ap-
proximately 281 trillion, or 248. This fuzzing experiment randomly samples and tests
500 of those combinations.
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4.3.4 Experiment 3: Transceiver Fingerprinting.
This experiment is designed to test the eectiveness of PHY preamble manipula-
tion as a Z-Wave transceiver ngerprinting technique. Testbed 1 (Section 4.3.1.1) is
used to individually test the nine devices with known Z-Wave SoCs listed in Table 7.
The SD3502 and ZW0301 SoCs are evenly represented by four devices each while the
ZW0401 is represented by one device due its comparative rarity.
Each device is subject to nine tests. Each test consists of transmitting 1,000
identical frames with a specic-length preamble to the device under test at 0.5 second
intervals while capturing device responses. Again taking advantage of compulsory
ACKs, the MAC frame previously depicted in Figure 18 is transmitted; however, the
DstID is set to that of the device under test. If the frame is successfully received, the
device under test will reply with a compulsory ACK, thus making measured response
rates analogous to reception rates. The rst test is a control, where a frame with the
standard preamble length of 10 bytes (Section 2.2.1) is transmitted. The remaining
tests are conducted identically to the control but with preambles lengths of seven
through zero bytes respectively.
Table 7. Nine Z-Wave Devices Under Test.




Dev2 Aeon Labs Smart Switch 6
Dev3 LinearLinc LED Light Bulb
Dev4 Aeon Labs LED Light Bulb
Dev5 ZW0401 SmartThings SmartThings Hub
Dev6
ZW0301
Aeon Labs Smart Energy Switch
Dev7 Everspring Lamp Socket
Dev8 Fortrezz Water Valve
Dev9 General Electric Outdoor Module
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The mean response rates per device per preamble length are calculated with a
99% Condence Interval (CI). Response rates are analyzed for statistical dierences,
similar to Figure 8 [KRM14], that may be exploited to distinguish among SoCs.
4.3.5 Experiment 4: Practical Transceiver Fingerprinting.
This experiment is designed to test whether or not the ngerprinting method
identied in Experiment 3 (Section 4.3.4) holds true in a practical environment. Using
Testbed 2 (Section 4.3.1.2), the same methodology used for Network Enumeration,
described in Section 4.3.2.1, is employed.
Again taking advantage of compulsory ACKs, the MAC frame previously depicted
in Figure 18 is transmitted. However, the preamble length of the injected frame is
set in accordance with the results of Experiment 3. Devices capable of receiving the
frame reply with a compulsory ACK. These ACKs are captured and unique SrcIDs
are recorded.
This process is repeated ve times at an interval of ve seconds in order to mitigate
the potential for missed ACKs due to collisions within the wireless medium. Finally,
unique SrcIDs from across each test are consolidated to provide a single list of devices
which responded to the test frame. The resulting list is analyzed to determine if the
method successfully discriminated among SoCs.
4.4 Summary
This chapter presents the methodologies used to identify Z-Wave network recon-
naissance techniques, device vulnerabilities through fuzzing, and Z-Wave transceiver
ngerprinting techniques via PHY manipulation. EZ-Wave is used to craft, inject,
and capture Z-Wave packets in four separate experiments to accomplish the afore-
mentioned research goals.
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V. Results and Analysis
5.1 Introduction
This chapter presents and analyzes the results of the experiments described in
Chapter IV. Section 5.2 discusses the successes and limitations of the network recon-
naissance techniques presented in Section 4.3.2. Section 5.3 presents the discoveries
found through fuzzing Z-Wave devices. Section 5.4 analyzes the eect of preamble
length on response rates and presents a method for ngerprinting Z-Wave transceivers.
Finally, Section 5.5 discusses the eectiveness of the aforementioned ngerprinting
technique in a practical scenario.
5.2 Experiment 1 Results
This experiment tests the active network reconnaissance techniques described in
Section 4.3.2. The techniques fall into two categories: network enumeration and
device interrogation. The success and limitations of each technique are discussed in
the subsequent sections.
5.2.1 Network Enumeration.
The technique tested to enumerate devices in the target Z-Wave HAN relies on
compulsory ACKs. EZ-Wave is used to inject a frame into the target network with
the broadcast DstID and the ACK Req ag set. Figure 23 illustrates the results of
this technique. All 15 devices included in the Z-Wave HAN under test (Figure 17 &
Table 6) acknowledged frame receipt, thus announcing their presence and enabling
the network to be enumerated.
While this technique proves successful under the conditions set in the experiment,
there are limitations. First, each node in the target HAN must be within the trans-
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Figure 23. Network Enumeration Results.
mission range of the SDR. Nodes outside this range will not receive the injected frame
and thus never generate an ACK frame. An SDR must also be within reception range
of each node in order to receive the generated ACKs. Additionally, this technique
will not reliably work with battery operated devices; these devices save power by
utilizing low duty cycles in which the transceiver is only active for short periods of
time. EZ-Wave does not currently support reliable communication with low-duty
cycle devices.
5.2.2 Device Interrogation.
The techniques tested to interrogate Z-Wave devices rely on the lack of source
authentication. EZ-Wave is used to individually target each device listed in Table 6
with the frames listed in Figure 19 with the intent to acquire the following device
information:
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 Device manufacturer and device type
 Software versions
 Supported Command Classes
 Operational status
 Conguration settings
Figure 24 illustrates the results of interrogating Dev13. These results demonstrate
the desired information is successfully retrieved from Dev13 using the techniques
discussed in Section 4.3.2.2. Similarly successful results were observed from all devices
included in the target Z-Wave HAN with the exceptions of Dev10 and Dev12. The
results from each device are included in Appendix A.
The results observed while interrogating Dev10 and Dev12 highlight two limita-
tions of this technique. Dev10 is the only device tested which supports encryption by
default. When paired with a controller that also supports encryption, which is the
Figure 24. Dev13 Interrogation Results.
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case in this experiment, many Command Classes are only supported when encrypted
using the Security Command Class. As shown in Figure 25, operational status in-
formation and conguration settings were not able to be retrieved due to the Basic
and Conguration Command Classes not being supported. The encryption by default
demonstrates a level of security not seen in any of the other devices tested.
Additionally, as depicted in Figure 26, Dev12 fails to respond to requests for
manufacturer, device, and software version information despite repeated attempts.
This behavior is likely due to the manufacturer-specic implementation of the APP
layer within this device. Because the device is intended to be a controller rather than
an end device, it is plausible the manufacturer saw no need to respond to requests
for this specic information.
5.3 Experiment 2 Results
Using the fuzzing framework and methodology described in Section 4.3.3 to test
the three Z-Wave devices for anomalous behavior and vulnerabilities. The limits of
Figure 25. Dev10 Interrogation Results.
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Figure 26. Dev12 Interrogation Results.
this experiment are bounded within two scenarios describing legitimate communi-
cations between Z-Wave devices. The results from each scenario are presented and
analyzed in the subsequent sections.
5.3.1 Scenario 1.
MAC layer processing is tested by fuzzing the SrcID, HeaderType, and Len elds
of a test message within this scenario (Figure 21). One or more of the identied
elds are selected to be mutated to a random invalid value prior to the execution of
the scenario. This is repeated 500 times per device under test while observing for
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anomalous behavior. All test messages generated and used in this experiment are
listed in Appendix D.1.
Across all devices under test, only three distinct behaviors are observed, depicted
in Table 8. The most common is Behavior 0, or the expected behavior of no response
and no action taken by the device under test. This is the expected behavior due to the
test message containing values outside the Z-Wave MAC layer specication [ITU15].
Analysis of the test messages (Appendix D.1) along with the corresponding observed
behavior reveals the conditions which lead to this behavior. The expected behavior is
observed when either the HeaderType or Len eld is invalid, with only one exception
(Behavior 2). This indicates both elds are validated prior to the processing of higher
layers.
Alternatively, if both the HeaderType and Len elds are indeed valid, Behavior 1
is observed without regard as to the validity of the SrcID eld. Behavior 1 is the
execution of the test message (e.g., processing of the LLC and APP layers). This
behavior is anomalous because it signies the frame is fully processed and determined
valid despite cases in which the SrcID eld is invalid. This indicates the SrcID is not
evaluated during MAC layer processing, but rather assumed to be correct.
Behavior 2 represents the one exception to the conditions which cause Behavior
0. It is only observed when the HeaderType eld has a value of x05 and the Len eld
Table 8. Scenario 1 Observed Behavior.
Device Tests Behavior 0* Behavior 1** Behavior 2***
Dev4 500 80.0% 17.8% 2.2%
Dev13 500 84.0% 13.2% 2.8%
Dev15 500 86.6% 12.0% 1.4%
*No response, no action taken
**Test message execution
***Valid response with unknown meaning
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is valid. Behavior 2 consists of a response from the device under test containing LLC
and APP layer data with unknown meaning. Figure 27 shows the packet capture of
the test message and the corresponding response, including an instance of the data
returned. However, the behavior does not include execution of the test message.
There appears to be no discernible patterns in the data across multiple observations
of this behavior other than always beginning with the value x2207. This behavior is
anomalous because 0x05 is not a valid value for the HeaderType eld according to
the MAC layer specication [ITU15]. Because this behavior is consistent across all
devices under test, it appears the value x05 represents an undocumented HeaderType.
Furthermore, because the test message is never executed, this HeaderType is plausibly
diagnostic in nature as it halts the processing of upper layers.
5.3.2 Scenario 2.
APP layer processing is tested by fuzzing the parameters of the Conguration Set
Command Class and Command combination. The APP layer of the test message
is mutated into a random list of parameters one to six bytes in length prior to the
Figure 27. Behavior 2 Observation.
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execution of the scenario (Figure 22). This is repeated 500 times per device under
test while observing for anomalous behavior. All test messages generated and used
in this experiment are listed in Appendix D.2.
In this scenario, expected behavior consists of the test message being acknowledged
by the device under test while valid conguration parameters are applied and invalid
parameters are ignored. This behavior is observed in 100% of all tests of Dev13
and Dev15. In other words, both Dev13 and Dev15 properly handle random invalid
parameters in all cases tested.
However, fuzzing Dev4 results in anomalous behavior in 51.6% of test cases. Anal-
ysis of the test messages (Appendix D.2), aided by a publicly available developer's
manual for this specic device [Aeo15], reveals the conditions which lead to this be-
havior. Table 9 illustrates the manufacturer's implementation of the Conguration
Command Class. The beginning of the random parameters generated in this sce-
nario aligns with the 3rd byte in this table. The anomalous behavior is observed only
when two specic conditions are met. Foremost, the value of the rst parameter must
equal one of the supported conguration parameters as determined using the network
reconnaissance techniques discussed in Section 5.2.2. The supported conguration pa-




7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
1 Command Class: Conguration (0x70)
2 Command: Set (0x5)
3 Parameter
4 Default Reserved Size
5 Conguration Value 1
6 Conguration Value 2
7 Conguration Value 3
8 Conguration Value 4
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rameters for Dev4 are listed in Appendix A. Secondly, the value of the three least
signicant bits of the second parameter must be greater than the number of bytes
remaining in the APP layer. These bits represent the byte length of the remainder
of the message. When these two conditions are met, Dev4 becomes unresponsive
until the power is physically cycled. This behavior indicates the manufacturer fails
to validate the Size eld in Table 9 leading to a possible buer over-read.
5.4 Experiment 3 Results
This experiment tests the response rates of three Z-Wave SoCs with respect to
preamble length. Response rates of nine devices, listed in Table 7, are measured
as the length of the preamble is deviated from the standard. The ZW0301 SoC is
represented by Dev1 through Dev4, the ZW0401 SoC by Dev5, and the SD3502 SoC
by Dev6 through Dev9. As discussed in Section 2.2.1, the standard preamble length
is 10 bytes.
Table 10 depicts the measured response rate per preamble length for each device
under test. Results indicate devices with the same SoC demonstrate statistically
indistinguishable response rates for each preamble length tested. Furthermore, results
provide strong evidence that a degree of transceiver distinction is possible.
Table 10. Device Response Rates per Preamble Length (99% CI).
Device 10B 7B 6B 5B 4B 3B 2B 1B 0B
Dev1 [89.0-93.7] [83.9-87.5] [81.4-87.4] [79.7-85.9] [76.7-83.3] [72.9-79.9] [0] [0] [0]
Dev2 [89.9-94.3] [87.4-92.3] [86.8-91.8] [86.1-91.3] [82.2-88.0] [76.4-83.0] [0] [0] [0]
Dev3 [87.4-92.4] [82.8-88.6] [86.0-91.2] [80.8-86.8] [81.7-87.5] [76.7-83.3] [0] [0] [0]
Dev4 [89.6-94.0] [87.4-92.4] [84.5-89.9] [84.1-89.7] [82.8-88.6] [76.6-83.2] [0] [0] [0]
Dev5 [96.3-98.8] [93.3-97.3] [92.7-99.3] [96.6-99.0] [96.9-99.2] [95.2-98.2] [0] [0] [0]
Dev6 [96.9-99.1] [95.6-98.4] [96.1-98.7] [94.9-97.9] [93.3-96.9] [95.1-98.1] [90.5-94.7] [0] [0]
Dev7 [94.9-97.9] [92.2-96.0] [93.6-97.0] [93.7-97.1] [95.1-98.1] [91.6-95.6] [89.3-93.9] [0] [0]
Dev8 [92.8-96.4] [96.2-98.8] [93.6-97.0] [91.4-95.4] [92.4-96.2] [93.0-96.6] [88.8-93.4] [0] [0]
Dev9 [94.9-97.9] [93.0-96.6] [92.2-96.0] [93.7-97.1] [93.8-97.2] [95.4-98.2] [90.5-94.7] [0] [0]
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Figure 28 reports the mean response rates for one device for each SoC type test.
The SD3502 SoC (Figure 28a) demonstrates a monotonic decline in response rate as
the preamble shortens. Additionally, the SD3502 fails to respond when preamble is
two bytes or less. Devices with the ZW0401 SoC (Figure 28b) respond consistently
for preambles greater than or equal to three bytes and fail to respond to frames with
preambles below this threshold. Likewise, the ZW0301 SoC (Figure 28c) demonstrates
the same consistent response rates as the ZW0401, but with a failure threshold of less
than two bytes.
These results strongly suggest a response to a frame with a 2-byte preamble in-
dicates the target device includes the ZW0301 SoC. The number of frames required
for a >99% probability of response from said SoC is calculated using the formula
(a) Dev1 (SD3502 SoC) [HRRL16]. (b) Dev5 (ZW0401 SoC).
(c) Dev6 (ZW0301 SoC) [HRRL16].
Figure 28. Z-Wave SoC Response Rates (99% CI).
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1  1(1  p)n  0:99, where p is the lower bound of the measured response rate from
Figure 28c (90.5%) and n is the number of packets required.
With only one device tested utilizing the ZW0401, it cannot be distinguished from
the SD3502 SoC using this technique with a high degree of condence. Therefore,
using this technique, the three Z-Wave SoCs can be classied into two groups with
>99% accuracy using as few as three test packets utilizing the decision tree illustrated
in Figure 29. Further classication may still be possible using other techniques. For
example, a one-bit resolution of the preamble length (compared to the byte resolu-
tion tested) may reveal distinguishable characteristics of the ZW0401 and SD3502 at
lengths between two and three bytes. Unfortunately, the current design of EZ-Wave
prevents the transmission of partial bytes thus preventing the evaluation of preamble
bit lengths where modulo eight is not zero.
5.5 Experiment 4 Results
This experiment tests the eectiveness of the classication decision tree (Figure
29) derived from the results of Experiment 3. In the previous experiment, each device
is individually tested using Testbed 2 (Section 4.3.1.2) to minimize interference. In
Figure 29. Z-Wave SoC classication decision tree.
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this experiment, Testbed 1 (Section 4.3.1.1) is used to test the classication decision
tree against a Z-Wave HAN consisting of 15 devices ranging from 14 meters to 30
meters from the SDRs. The broadcast frame previously depicted in Figure 18, but
with a preamble of only two bytes, is injected into the HAN twice, with a one second
interval. This process is repeated ve times at an interval of three seconds to minimize
missed ACKs due to collisions within the wireless medium.
Figure 30 reports the results of the test. A total of eight of 15 devices acknowledge
receiving the test frame, indicating each device includes the ZW0301 SoC. Dev7
through Dev9 are already known to t this classication as they are the same devices
under test used in Experiment 3. Additionally, Dev12 through Dev15 respond with
an ACK indicating they too include the ZW0301 SoC. The devices which did not
acknowledge the frame include Dev1 through Dev5, which are already known to have
SD3502 or ZW0401 SoCs, as well as Dev10 and Dev11.
After physically investigating the devices, Dev12 through Dev15 are veried as
having the ZW0301 SoC. Furthermore, Dev10 and Dev11 are veried as having the
SD3502 SoC. The test accurately identied 100% of all devices with ZW0301 SoCs
Figure 30. Experiment 4 results.
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with no false positives. Results strongly indicate the ZW0301 can be accurately
and reliably distinguished from other Z-Wave SoCs using the preamble developed
manipulation ngerprinting technique.
5.6 Summary
This chapter presents and analyzes the results of four separate experiments. Sec-
tion 5.2 demonstrates the network reconnaissance techniques presented in Section
4.3.2 are successful in enumerating a Z-Wave HAN and interrogating Z-Wave devices.
In Section 5.3, a fuzzing methodology is successfully employed to identify a vulnera-
bility in one Z-Wave device, as well as anomalous behavior in all devices tested. A
technique for classifying Z-Wave SoCs into two groups with >99% accuracy with at
most three test packets is identied in Section 5.4. Finally, Section 5.5 demonstrates
the aforementioned technique can accurately and reliably classify Z-Wave SoCs in a
practical network environment.
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VI. Conclusion and Recommendations
6.1 Introduction
This chapter summarizes the overall conclusions of the research. Section 6.2
presents conclusions derived from the experiments conducted. Section 6.3 discusses
the signicance of this research. Finally, Section 6.4 outlines recommendations for
future research.
6.2 Conclusions of Research
6.2.1 Goal 1: Identify methods for conducting active network recon-
naissance against Z-Wave HANs.
Z-Wave network enumeration is successfully demonstrated on a HAN consisting
of 15 devices from up to 30 meters by exploiting compulsory acknowledgments. Addi-
tionally, device interrogation is successfully demonstrated on all 15 devices under test
by injecting frames specically-crafted by reverse engineering the proprietary Z-Wave
protocol. Information gathered from each device under test includes device man-
ufacturer, device type, supported Command Classes, software versions, operational
status, and conguration settings.
6.2.2 Goal 2: Identify vulnerabilities, through fuzzing, in Z-Wave de-
vices resulting in anomalous behavior.
Using the presented fuzzing engine and methodology, three conditions are iden-
tied which result in anomalous behavior. The rst condition is observed uniformly
across all three devices under test and suggests devices fail to validate the SrcID of
received messages. The second condition is also observed uniformly across all devices
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under test. This condition suggests the existence of an undocumented HeaderType
value which solicits a currently unknown response. Finally, the third condition is only
observed in one device under test and results in the device becoming non-responsive.
This behavior is observed when the Size eld of the Conguration Set Command
is greater than the remaining bytes of the APP layer, suggesting the device fails to
validate this value leading to a buer over-read vulnerability.
6.2.3 Goal 3: Identify PHY preamble manipulations to enable dis-
crimination among Z-Wave SoCs.
Z-Wave SoC discrimination is successfully demonstrated using preamble manip-
ulation. Three SoCs are classied into two groups with greater than 99% accuracy
using no more than three test packets. Furthermore, this method is successfully tested
with 100% accuracy against a Z-Wave HAN consisting of 15 devices at distances up
to 30 meters.
6.3 Signicance of Research
With the continued growth of WSNs in home automation, critical infrastructure,
smart metering, and security solutions, the ability to evaluate the underlying wireless
protocols becomes critical for ensuring secure design. While open wireless standards,
such as IEEE 802.15.4 and IEEE 802.11, have been studied at length, few published
works evaluate the security of the proprietary Z-Wave protocol, despite growing pop-
ularity.
This research presents EZ-Wave, a system designed for interacting with Z-Wave
networks and devices using software-dened radios. Using EZ-Wave, the rst pub-
lished methods for active network reconnaissance, device fuzzing, and Z-Wave SoC
classication are identied. The active network reconnaissance methods result in
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network enumeration and device interrogation. The device fuzzing method identies
three packet malformations leading to anomalous device behavior. The SoC classica-
tion method successfully classies Z-Wave SoCs into two groups with >99% accuracy.
Furthermore, Hall and Ramsey have implemented these methods in open source tools
presented for public use [HR16a, HR16b, Szc16, Smi16].
6.4 Recommendations for Future Research
This research identies methods for active network reconnaissance, vulnerability
discovery via fuzzing, and SoC classication; however, each warrants further study.
Currently, EZ-Wave does not support the NWK, SAR, and ENC adaptation layers,
nor does it support communicating with low-duty cycle devices. The development of
these capabilities enables a signicantly broader range of security testing. Further-
more, this research applies the fuzzing methodology and framework presented to test
a small number of scenarios and devices. There is signicant opportunity to expand
fuzz testing to include additional Command Classes and devices not included in this
research. Finally, additional transceiver ngerprinting techniques warrant study in
order to uniquely discriminate among each Z-Wave SoC.
6.5 Summary
This chapter presents conclusions from the research. The research signicance
and recommendations for future work are also discussed.
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Appendix A. List of Devices
This appendix provides details for every Z-Wave device tested, including data







































A.2 Dev2: Aeotec Smart Switch 6
Model ZW096-A02
FCC ID XBAFT096

























































A.3 Dev3: Linear LED Light Bulb
Model LB60Z-1
FCC ID EF400126































A.4 Dev4: Aeotec LED Light Bulb
Model ZW098-A52
FCC ID XBAFT107










































A.5 Dev5: SmartThings Hub
Model STH-ETH-001
FCC ID R3Y-STH-ETH001































A.6 Dev6: Aeotec Smart Energy Switch
Model DSC06106-ZWUS
FCC ID XBA20100207



































A.7 Dev7: Everspring Lamp Socket
Model AN 145-1
FCC ID FU5TR003-04




























A.8 Dev8: Fortrezz Water Valve
Model WV-01-075
FCC ID XCT-Z3US






Product Name: x0215 (Water Valve)
Version


















A.9 Dev9: GE Outdoor Appliance Module
Model ZW4201
FCC ID U2Z45604



























A.10 Dev10: Aeotec Siren Gen5
Model ZW080-A17
FCC ID XBAZW080

























A.11 Dev11: NuTone Smart LED Light Bulb
Model NLB60Z
FCC ID EF400126































A.12 Dev12: RaZberry Pi
Model RaZberry Pi
FCC ID CFR47 P15.249
System on Chip ZW0301
Manual Link




























A.13 Dev13: Fortrezz Siren & Strobe Alarm
Model SSA1/2
FCC ID XCT-Z3US



























A.14 Dev14: Everspring Appliance Module
Model AN 163-1
FCC ID FU5AN163































A.15 Dev15: GE Lamp Module
Model ZW3101
FCC ID U2Z45602-3



































Appendix B. Z-Wave Command Classes
Table 26 lists known Command Classes and associated Commands compiled from
a combination of [Ozw15], [RaZ15], [Sma15], and trac analysis.

















































































































































CRC16Encap x56 Encap (x01)












































































































































































































Appendix C. EZ-Wave Installation & Source Code
EZ-Wave source code and installation instructions are located at https://github.
com/AFITWiSec/EZ-Wave
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Appendix D. Experiment 2 Test Messages
D.1 Scenario 1
The following subsections contain the randomized test messages described in Ex-
periment 2 Scenario 1 (Section 4.3.3.1). The Behavior column (Beh) indicates the











1 249 6 13 0
2 234 5 13 2
3 249 1 13 1
4 249 1 243 0
5 1 1 154 0
6 1 1 85 0
7 1 1 188 0
8 254 4 83 0
9 253 14 13 0
10 1 12 190 0
11 1 16 13 0
12 1 8 189 0
13 238 1 220 0
14 243 1 13 1
15 233 11 232 0
16 236 15 13 0
17 241 1 249 0
18 237 14 13 0
19 249 5 183 0
20 1 16 251 0
21 236 5 13 2
22 234 1 13 1
23 1 16 13 0
24 1 9 13 0
25 246 14 252 0
26 252 1 13 1
27 243 1 13 1
28 249 1 13 1
29 251 15 13 0
30 240 8 13 0
31 1 10 201 0
32 1 1 94 0
33 1 12 236 0
34 1 1 200 0
35 1 6 13 0
36 1 15 13 0
37 248 1 123 0
38 1 7 13 0
39 1 1 173 0
40 245 1 13 1
41 1 4 13 0
42 1 1 56 0
43 1 1 249 0
44 1 14 209 0
45 1 8 184 0
46 239 1 13 1





47 1 12 137 0
48 1 10 13 0
49 247 1 115 0
50 242 6 13 0
51 1 4 210 0
52 1 1 135 0
53 1 4 199 0
54 1 1 185 0
55 248 1 170 0
56 233 7 13 0
57 244 9 13 0
58 1 11 248 0
59 241 1 118 0
60 1 1 231 0
61 237 1 136 0
62 235 1 90 0
63 239 1 13 1
64 235 16 248 0
65 1 1 115 0
66 1 10 168 0
67 1 1 103 0
68 249 14 13 0
69 1 6 13 0
70 238 1 13 1
71 1 4 181 0
72 1 0 110 0
73 240 0 13 1
74 1 6 13 0
75 239 13 93 0
76 1 1 246 0
77 253 16 197 0
78 252 11 93 0
79 247 1 62 0
80 1 1 56 0
81 246 1 186 0
82 236 1 174 0
83 1 0 13 0
84 243 1 13 1
85 248 8 13 0
86 248 1 250 0
87 243 8 112 0
88 239 1 174 0
89 243 12 160 0
90 1 5 110 0
91 1 1 254 0
92 1 1 219 0
93 1 1 254 0
94 1 1 240 0





95 1 12 13 0
96 1 4 13 0
97 249 4 85 0
98 1 1 58 0
99 238 1 13 1
100 247 16 250 0
101 240 1 13 1
102 248 1 110 0
103 1 1 244 0
104 1 0 96 0
105 252 7 111 0
106 240 4 94 0
107 1 11 13 0
108 250 1 13 1
109 1 1 203 0
110 234 15 145 0
111 243 16 160 0
112 1 1 137 0
113 244 1 239 0
114 247 1 13 1
115 241 5 13 2
116 1 9 59 0
117 251 5 13 2
118 236 12 78 0
119 1 1 235 0
120 1 10 226 0
121 248 1 13 1
122 236 1 94 0
123 243 4 231 0
124 254 12 13 0
125 240 1 137 0
126 1 12 13 0
127 1 1 86 0
128 243 1 197 0
129 250 6 190 0
130 245 1 13 1
131 249 1 13 1
132 1 15 13 0
133 241 1 57 0
134 254 1 13 1
135 1 1 231 0
136 239 1 13 1
137 247 1 108 0
138 1 8 227 0
139 1 1 190 0
140 1 15 13 0
141 254 1 223 0
142 239 16 182 0






143 242 1 180 0
144 1 1 225 0
145 251 14 13 0
146 1 1 181 0
147 246 0 13 1
148 254 10 13 0
149 235 14 13 0
150 1 1 161 0
151 1 15 249 0
152 1 7 198 0
153 241 14 193 0
154 1 9 80 0
155 1 9 13 0
156 247 0 13 1
157 253 1 13 1
158 1 6 13 0
159 253 1 13 1
160 252 1 13 1
161 252 10 78 0
162 234 13 109 0
163 253 15 13 0
164 242 1 164 0
165 238 1 129 0
166 249 5 243 0
167 239 1 13 1
168 1 1 238 0
169 241 10 237 0
170 242 14 13 0
171 1 13 197 0
172 1 1 140 0
173 253 1 13 1
174 1 9 13 0
175 244 1 13 1
176 1 1 72 0
177 241 14 98 0
178 1 14 139 0
179 244 12 13 0
180 249 4 65 0
181 239 1 13 1
182 254 1 13 1
183 249 1 13 1
184 1 1 150 0
185 253 10 61 0
186 250 15 13 0
187 254 1 13 1
188 1 1 60 0
189 246 0 192 0
190 254 1 142 0





191 242 1 13 1
192 236 1 13 1
193 249 0 13 1
194 1 11 13 0
195 246 15 13 0
196 236 12 13 0
197 253 8 202 0
198 233 1 187 0
199 237 1 188 0
200 1 1 120 0
201 236 1 189 0
202 249 10 161 0
203 236 16 153 0
204 246 5 94 0
205 238 9 162 0
206 248 4 13 0
207 237 12 13 0
208 246 1 64 0
209 242 13 13 0
210 243 1 13 1
211 1 1 103 0
212 239 1 13 1
213 250 1 13 1
214 1 1 239 0
215 238 1 13 1
216 252 1 13 1
217 251 10 13 0
218 250 1 116 0
219 241 1 13 1
220 237 1 69 0
221 247 0 13 1
222 250 8 243 0
223 240 4 248 0
224 1 1 174 0
225 233 8 58 0
226 234 1 13 1
227 235 6 240 0
228 239 10 208 0
229 1 1 183 0
230 249 1 68 0
231 1 1 217 0
232 1 4 135 0
233 1 7 13 0
234 241 14 13 0
235 235 14 182 0
236 1 1 238 0
237 243 8 13 0
238 243 4 148 0





239 1 13 13 0
240 252 14 13 0
241 1 1 129 0
242 1 14 13 0
243 248 1 13 1
244 250 10 234 0
245 1 4 79 0
246 252 7 13 0
247 238 0 68 0
248 1 1 118 0
249 237 4 13 0
250 252 15 66 0
251 251 13 13 0
252 1 0 163 0
253 1 12 13 0
254 240 1 13 1
255 1 10 158 0
256 254 5 13 2
257 245 1 154 0
258 1 13 112 0
259 245 10 77 0
260 253 5 13 2
261 1 13 101 0
262 1 11 13 0
263 254 1 13 1
264 1 6 13 0
265 1 6 13 0
266 243 16 13 0
267 242 1 80 0
268 247 1 171 0
269 242 1 13 1
270 242 15 13 0
271 239 0 59 0
272 249 7 231 0
273 238 9 79 0
274 247 1 225 0
275 244 1 13 1
276 243 6 160 0
277 1 1 117 0
278 1 6 156 0
279 245 1 71 0
280 244 15 234 0
281 239 11 114 0
282 1 6 163 0
283 242 1 13 1
284 1 1 97 0
285 1 1 245 0
286 1 9 252 0






287 253 0 13 1
288 251 5 164 0
289 244 16 13 0
290 1 1 158 0
291 1 7 13 0
292 237 13 13 0
293 1 16 13 0
294 233 1 223 0
295 1 13 192 0
296 244 1 13 1
297 244 0 59 0
298 1 4 215 0
299 254 4 190 0
300 1 1 155 0
301 1 7 212 0
302 239 1 13 1
303 1 1 191 0
304 249 5 13 2
305 233 6 68 0
306 246 1 13 1
307 247 10 13 0
308 1 6 13 0
309 245 1 131 0
310 244 1 13 1
311 236 13 74 0
312 251 16 13 0
313 237 1 61 0
314 233 1 214 0
315 1 8 79 0
316 1 1 220 0
317 240 4 13 0
318 1 16 188 0
319 1 1 65 0
320 1 1 150 0
321 1 10 92 0
322 1 1 104 0
323 1 6 161 0
324 250 1 13 1
325 243 9 154 0
326 1 5 70 0
327 1 6 195 0
328 238 1 13 1
329 1 16 13 0
330 250 14 13 0
331 1 13 13 0
332 236 13 13 0
333 242 14 13 0
334 1 1 236 0





335 234 4 91 0
336 1 1 56 0
337 247 1 247 0
338 249 1 13 1
339 241 1 101 0
340 1 1 143 0
341 234 9 13 0
342 248 1 13 1
343 1 0 13 0
344 248 1 13 1
345 1 1 156 0
346 240 4 13 0
347 233 1 56 0
348 242 1 166 0
349 1 1 67 0
350 1 14 13 0
351 252 1 230 0
352 247 10 13 0
353 1 1 171 0
354 1 12 78 0
355 248 6 244 0
356 250 1 81 0
357 1 1 89 0
358 1 1 226 0
359 251 1 255 0
360 249 5 242 0
361 250 1 156 0
362 233 1 13 1
363 252 1 13 1
364 248 11 140 0
365 1 6 196 0
366 1 6 73 0
367 245 1 13 1
368 251 16 226 0
369 1 13 150 0
370 237 1 13 1
371 1 1 231 0
372 1 14 13 0
373 235 8 13 0
374 1 7 13 0
375 1 1 194 0
376 236 1 13 1
377 1 8 61 0
378 239 6 182 0
379 1 5 165 0
380 1 6 86 0
381 246 11 72 0
382 252 1 65 0





383 247 5 13 2
384 1 1 112 0
385 253 1 221 0
386 235 5 115 0
387 1 11 13 0
388 1 1 235 0
389 1 15 13 0
390 1 11 13 0
391 1 15 13 0
392 1 16 13 0
393 1 9 13 0
394 1 13 13 0
395 1 15 111 0
396 1 14 13 0
397 254 1 13 1
398 1 1 183 0
399 1 8 13 0
400 233 0 13 1
401 233 12 13 0
402 244 7 206 0
403 243 1 13 1
404 1 9 180 0
405 250 15 13 0
406 235 15 175 0
407 241 1 13 1
408 240 16 225 0
409 234 1 13 1
410 1 10 183 0
411 252 6 93 0
412 235 1 13 1
413 242 4 175 0
414 1 6 13 0
415 244 11 152 0
416 253 10 211 0
417 1 1 92 0
418 1 14 13 0
419 1 1 164 0
420 1 14 102 0
421 253 1 13 1
422 250 13 13 0
423 1 15 91 0
424 1 1 237 0
425 243 1 13 1
426 251 0 176 0
427 1 13 58 0
428 1 1 208 0
429 254 1 13 1
430 251 1 171 0






431 248 10 13 0
432 1 14 73 0
433 244 1 13 1
434 245 5 13 2
435 234 1 228 0
436 1 1 251 0
437 1 1 121 0
438 236 1 13 1
439 254 12 205 0
440 242 1 151 0
441 242 1 13 1
442 234 16 13 0
443 238 1 13 1
444 236 11 13 0
445 245 9 13 0
446 249 1 13 1
447 1 1 164 0
448 237 13 13 0
449 236 16 77 0
450 249 1 140 0
451 237 13 160 0
452 251 9 87 0
453 245 1 185 0
454 250 1 13 1
455 238 6 203 0
456 252 1 13 1
457 252 1 125 0
458 233 5 13 2
459 1 4 13 0
460 245 9 13 0
461 253 9 13 0
462 234 1 207 0
463 241 1 13 1
464 252 1 86 0
465 243 1 210 0
466 249 5 13 2
467 241 4 88 0
468 242 0 13 1
469 240 1 13 1
470 253 1 13 1
471 248 1 13 1
472 1 1 225 0
473 234 1 105 0
474 251 1 108 0
475 244 1 206 0
476 252 15 193 0
477 252 1 13 1
478 1 10 13 0





479 1 10 13 0
480 1 12 13 0
481 235 4 13 0
482 1 1 166 0
483 248 1 13 1
484 247 1 13 1
485 233 1 136 0
486 240 1 184 0
487 1 7 13 0
488 1 1 175 0
489 236 0 240 0
490 1 1 92 0
491 1 8 82 0
492 243 1 57 0
493 1 16 13 0
494 238 1 58 0
495 241 10 227 0
496 1 14 133 0
497 243 1 141 0
498 1 1 77 0
499 240 8 194 0







1 238 1 140 0
2 1 6 13 0
3 239 13 57 0
4 1 16 143 0
5 251 4 13 0
6 1 14 86 0
7 1 9 112 0
8 233 5 13 2
9 249 1 13 1
10 252 7 67 0
11 1 1 146 0
12 1 7 56 0
13 1 13 13 0
14 235 1 252 0
15 242 14 13 0
16 246 1 139 0
17 1 13 221 0
18 240 1 13 1
19 235 1 147 0
20 235 11 237 0
21 252 7 13 0
22 1 15 184 0
23 243 15 222 0
24 245 15 204 0
25 235 1 13 1
26 1 4 168 0
27 240 1 13 1
28 1 1 110 0
29 1 16 56 0
30 1 1 162 0
31 1 13 58 0
32 1 1 108 0
33 1 11 13 0
34 1 1 213 0
35 244 14 13 0
36 245 5 146 0
37 1 14 207 0
38 253 1 116 0
39 246 1 200 0
40 237 15 13 0
41 248 4 13 0
42 1 1 120 0
43 1 15 166 0
44 239 1 73 0
45 235 1 13 1
46 1 12 251 0





47 245 12 220 0
48 1 1 112 0
49 243 1 13 1
50 247 1 13 1
51 240 1 244 0
52 1 1 98 0
53 1 8 13 0
54 1 15 13 0
55 251 1 13 1
56 244 7 211 0
57 1 1 251 0
58 1 6 13 0
59 1 0 13 0
60 241 13 101 0
61 252 1 13 1
62 248 1 65 0
63 1 11 13 0
64 253 1 211 0
65 246 12 13 0
66 1 6 13 0
67 1 12 97 0
68 241 1 13 1
69 245 10 214 0
70 1 12 13 0
71 1 9 13 0
72 244 10 150 0
73 250 14 80 0
74 1 15 13 0
75 254 13 13 0
76 1 4 13 0
77 1 16 13 0
78 1 14 241 0
79 252 1 13 1
80 239 4 146 0
81 1 7 13 0
82 1 0 13 0
83 241 12 13 0
84 236 1 13 1
85 245 5 13 2
86 247 1 13 1
87 1 0 13 0
88 1 8 178 0
89 1 1 72 0
90 1 8 13 0
91 1 1 169 0
92 1 15 213 0
93 254 16 13 0
94 1 7 13 0





95 1 10 13 0
96 242 1 83 0
97 236 9 140 0
98 246 8 80 0
99 1 15 226 0
100 239 5 221 0
101 1 6 128 0
102 243 15 13 0
103 245 6 13 0
104 1 1 104 0
105 1 1 157 0
106 249 7 13 0
107 1 1 162 0
108 239 1 66 0
109 235 5 74 0
110 235 1 147 0
111 249 14 13 0
112 253 16 69 0
113 245 1 58 0
114 253 7 138 0
115 247 15 13 0
116 1 13 139 0
117 1 12 55 0
118 235 1 251 0
119 240 5 121 0
120 1 10 87 0
121 251 15 68 0
122 1 1 114 0
123 233 8 13 0
124 1 5 187 0
125 241 9 159 0
126 236 5 13 2
127 234 0 76 0
128 1 16 123 0
129 235 1 168 0
130 233 1 13 1
131 244 1 13 1
132 248 15 113 0
133 1 15 250 0
134 1 4 207 0
135 1 1 216 0
136 1 12 13 0
137 247 1 13 1
138 1 1 245 0
139 235 1 175 0
140 237 13 13 0
141 1 7 93 0
142 251 1 206 0






143 1 16 13 0
144 1 1 109 0
145 1 15 13 0
146 1 4 13 0
147 1 16 240 0
148 253 6 13 0
149 1 4 13 0
150 1 4 13 0
151 1 4 13 0
152 242 1 13 1
153 1 10 13 0
154 1 1 104 0
155 1 11 13 0
156 1 4 75 0
157 236 1 13 1
158 247 7 173 0
159 1 15 13 0
160 1 10 245 0
161 1 12 252 0
162 246 6 104 0
163 241 5 213 0
164 234 1 13 1
165 237 1 13 1
166 1 1 179 0
167 1 11 253 0
168 235 1 13 1
169 1 9 13 0
170 1 11 84 0
171 1 6 13 0
172 246 16 241 0
173 242 6 172 0
174 241 5 177 0
175 234 0 152 0
176 248 5 13 2
177 1 9 13 0
178 244 1 155 0
179 242 1 204 0
180 235 13 13 0
181 251 1 150 0
182 1 15 13 0
183 239 1 202 0
184 1 13 13 0
185 235 1 13 1
186 1 4 13 0
187 241 1 13 1
188 246 5 139 0
189 252 1 164 0
190 235 6 228 0





191 1 0 13 0
192 1 1 251 0
193 1 9 13 0
194 1 16 13 0
195 237 9 13 0
196 1 1 226 0
197 240 13 218 0
198 1 16 99 0
199 1 12 92 0
200 246 9 178 0
201 1 6 190 0
202 254 12 216 0
203 243 1 13 1
204 248 1 57 0
205 251 1 169 0
206 234 13 166 0
207 1 1 171 0
208 235 7 117 0
209 1 12 13 0
210 1 5 230 0
211 246 10 13 0
212 254 16 98 0
213 1 1 246 0
214 233 1 13 1
215 253 1 13 1
216 1 1 157 0
217 1 9 99 0
218 1 4 13 0
219 242 1 212 0
220 1 1 85 0
221 1 16 13 0
222 239 10 13 0
223 1 1 242 0
224 239 1 13 1
225 251 1 58 0
226 251 0 191 0
227 251 1 172 0
228 249 0 13 1
229 244 9 78 0
230 233 1 191 0
231 235 1 121 0
232 240 1 13 1
233 239 14 13 0
234 1 0 13 0
235 239 1 13 1
236 1 5 98 0
237 251 7 13 0
238 1 7 13 0





239 236 13 13 0
240 234 1 13 1
241 238 1 204 0
242 1 1 210 0
243 243 12 155 0
244 247 1 13 1
245 236 1 195 0
246 1 12 250 0
247 246 16 100 0
248 241 1 13 1
249 253 1 98 0
250 244 1 247 0
251 250 1 13 1
252 1 1 109 0
253 1 1 218 0
254 246 1 13 1
255 248 9 13 0
256 243 13 13 0
257 1 1 65 0
258 239 14 13 0
259 1 1 214 0
260 1 13 13 0
261 1 15 174 0
262 1 1 222 0
263 253 11 13 0
264 1 6 198 0
265 1 7 13 0
266 1 14 79 0
267 252 1 165 0
268 254 5 13 2
269 254 1 167 0
270 248 1 13 1
271 1 8 13 0
272 239 1 205 0
273 234 1 13 1
274 1 15 13 0
275 1 1 116 0
276 241 13 13 0
277 249 5 13 2
278 1 7 237 0
279 254 1 13 1
280 242 5 153 0
281 242 6 195 0
282 254 1 13 1
283 245 9 100 0
284 252 1 57 0
285 234 1 13 1
286 238 16 107 0






287 1 1 143 0
288 238 10 13 0
289 248 5 13 2
290 235 1 170 0
291 249 1 103 0
292 252 15 13 0
293 1 15 110 0
294 252 1 13 1
295 1 13 13 0
296 1 11 13 0
297 243 5 13 2
298 1 6 129 0
299 1 15 13 0
300 1 6 64 0
301 243 1 193 0
302 1 1 87 0
303 1 1 158 0
304 249 4 13 0
305 244 9 13 0
306 238 1 13 1
307 240 10 209 0
308 1 1 194 0
309 245 16 13 0
310 247 1 194 0
311 1 13 13 0
312 239 12 13 0
313 254 1 13 1
314 1 8 13 0
315 252 1 13 1
316 241 1 209 0
317 248 16 13 0
318 241 14 187 0
319 1 8 13 0
320 1 12 224 0
321 235 16 101 0
322 251 1 13 1
323 237 1 230 0
324 1 16 13 0
325 1 1 106 0
326 242 1 13 1
327 235 10 153 0
328 240 1 13 1
329 1 1 150 0
330 252 15 160 0
331 1 10 13 0
332 1 10 249 0
333 239 8 13 0
334 239 1 13 1





335 252 10 163 0
336 243 1 13 1
337 233 8 13 0
338 248 1 124 0
339 1 0 206 0
340 247 1 13 1
341 253 1 146 0
342 236 1 13 1
343 237 5 13 2
344 240 1 115 0
345 1 15 13 0
346 250 11 13 0
347 1 16 13 0
348 1 1 219 0
349 240 15 13 0
350 1 7 195 0
351 1 7 192 0
352 246 1 13 1
353 238 13 13 0
354 249 13 13 0
355 251 1 142 0
356 1 6 13 0
357 246 16 125 0
358 239 8 177 0
359 242 1 161 0
360 1 1 68 0
361 1 0 13 0
362 240 1 245 0
363 235 4 13 0
364 244 11 13 0
365 245 1 175 0
366 1 10 141 0
367 1 1 220 0
368 254 1 13 1
369 1 10 13 0
370 233 1 111 0
371 1 1 111 0
372 1 4 229 0
373 1 6 13 0
374 1 1 58 0
375 233 1 13 1
376 242 13 192 0
377 1 15 111 0
378 1 7 250 0
379 253 9 13 0
380 1 1 189 0
381 1 4 236 0
382 1 1 164 0





383 1 4 13 0
384 250 4 13 0
385 1 10 135 0
386 1 11 185 0
387 234 1 188 0
388 245 1 13 1
389 252 1 13 1
390 245 8 13 0
391 237 12 101 0
392 239 5 13 2
393 244 7 13 0
394 1 7 13 0
395 253 5 13 2
396 1 1 230 0
397 1 16 219 0
398 241 10 13 0
399 236 1 251 0
400 1 1 217 0
401 1 11 63 0
402 252 16 80 0
403 1 14 220 0
404 233 1 13 1
405 252 5 13 2
406 233 5 13 2
407 1 1 195 0
408 1 15 96 0
409 1 1 160 0
410 252 1 240 0
411 246 4 57 0
412 1 1 55 0
413 1 15 13 0
414 233 5 65 0
415 245 1 131 0
416 234 12 98 0
417 237 1 13 1
418 244 1 210 0
419 251 7 233 0
420 234 1 212 0
421 1 13 220 0
422 242 1 128 0
423 1 13 111 0
424 248 1 56 0
425 252 14 13 0
426 252 1 92 0
427 1 15 110 0
428 1 16 98 0
429 237 1 239 0
430 1 1 246 0






431 241 7 13 0
432 243 1 13 1
433 1 7 13 0
434 252 1 56 0
435 1 1 117 0
436 1 13 209 0
437 245 1 141 0
438 252 1 217 0
439 1 14 13 0
440 245 7 13 0
441 1 1 231 0
442 1 15 161 0
443 250 1 13 1
444 238 12 13 0
445 251 1 13 1
446 1 1 115 0
447 254 1 191 0
448 246 7 13 0
449 1 9 13 0
450 1 16 13 0
451 253 1 13 1
452 1 15 13 0
453 246 6 13 0
454 238 12 13 0
455 238 15 162 0
456 245 1 233 0
457 246 16 13 0
458 1 4 140 0
459 246 1 136 0
460 1 11 13 0
461 1 16 13 0
462 234 5 13 2
463 253 1 179 0
464 238 1 243 0
465 250 1 105 0
466 254 1 158 0
467 1 9 131 0
468 236 9 13 0
469 1 9 222 0
470 233 6 96 0
471 242 15 13 0
472 245 1 156 0
473 237 11 237 0
474 241 4 13 0
475 237 6 102 0
476 235 16 155 0
477 251 15 58 0
478 1 10 13 0





479 245 1 13 1
480 1 6 238 0
481 1 16 13 0
482 1 1 184 0
483 246 1 196 0
484 240 7 207 0
485 249 1 234 0
486 252 4 117 0
487 1 1 134 0
488 235 4 174 0
489 241 1 13 1
490 1 16 13 0
491 1 1 236 0
492 233 1 192 0
493 1 15 239 0
494 243 1 13 1
495 238 4 13 0
496 245 11 13 0
497 1 1 194 0
498 1 1 85 0
499 237 1 13 1







1 1 7 13 0
2 244 5 13 2
3 1 15 13 0
4 238 1 13 1
5 235 16 182 0
6 237 1 13 1
7 254 6 13 0
8 1 12 56 0
9 241 10 61 0
10 1 4 13 0
11 251 12 13 0
12 242 0 106 0
13 1 15 13 0
14 254 1 13 1
15 236 1 13 1
16 1 7 13 0
17 1 1 104 0
18 1 4 13 0
19 1 7 13 0
20 1 9 13 0
21 239 1 13 1
22 240 1 13 1
23 237 1 171 0
24 1 1 178 0
25 1 1 82 0
26 1 15 227 0
27 240 1 13 1
28 253 12 13 0
29 243 8 166 0
30 246 1 191 0
31 1 11 13 0
32 243 16 13 0
33 239 14 208 0
34 1 9 95 0
35 249 1 151 0
36 241 1 167 0
37 244 6 200 0
38 1 1 133 0
39 1 4 13 0
40 1 1 188 0
41 1 7 13 0
42 1 12 13 0
43 247 4 94 0
44 1 10 13 0
45 247 1 210 0
46 253 14 154 0





47 1 4 13 0
48 1 16 192 0
49 252 0 182 0
50 236 4 13 0
51 253 1 249 0
52 234 0 197 0
53 249 1 171 0
54 251 1 217 0
55 252 1 13 1
56 252 1 13 1
57 1 15 13 0
58 250 11 13 0
59 245 1 190 0
60 237 12 13 0
61 1 7 226 0
62 243 13 237 0
63 1 12 13 0
64 1 9 13 0
65 235 5 13 2
66 1 16 199 0
67 244 5 105 0
68 1 14 13 0
69 242 13 110 0
70 233 1 103 0
71 249 10 13 0
72 1 1 228 0
73 1 14 123 0
74 249 1 210 0
75 247 1 13 1
76 250 1 235 0
77 236 1 192 0
78 1 8 13 0
79 254 15 240 0
80 1 7 100 0
81 1 5 235 0
82 1 1 114 0
83 250 16 13 0
84 238 12 252 0
85 248 14 13 0
86 253 12 161 0
87 248 14 95 0
88 1 1 72 0
89 239 12 117 0
90 1 8 216 0
91 235 1 154 0
92 248 1 13 1
93 1 1 72 0
94 242 1 13 1





95 1 0 13 0
96 241 13 13 0
97 1 9 174 0
98 233 7 96 0
99 239 1 13 1
100 1 11 13 0
101 253 1 216 0
102 239 1 212 0
103 242 6 13 0
104 246 14 13 0
105 1 1 172 0
106 245 1 13 1
107 240 4 199 0
108 252 10 13 0
109 1 14 189 0
110 1 12 13 0
111 238 13 193 0
112 1 8 143 0
113 242 12 77 0
114 1 11 78 0
115 244 7 13 0
116 239 13 13 0
117 240 10 111 0
118 1 13 161 0
119 244 7 13 0
120 252 1 152 0
121 251 1 13 1
122 1 13 115 0
123 1 8 70 0
124 239 1 74 0
125 1 1 205 0
126 243 8 13 0
127 1 1 142 0
128 252 1 109 0
129 1 14 13 0
130 237 1 72 0
131 239 1 92 0
132 249 5 13 2
133 245 6 13 0
134 1 16 222 0
135 1 1 221 0
136 237 1 159 0
137 1 1 254 0
138 244 4 13 0
139 1 1 177 0
140 238 6 13 0
141 248 9 13 0
142 249 1 13 1






143 1 14 163 0
144 1 14 13 0
145 247 10 13 0
146 1 7 13 0
147 235 8 249 0
148 233 1 13 1
149 1 16 13 0
150 1 11 114 0
151 241 1 96 0
152 242 14 178 0
153 1 13 116 0
154 236 7 13 0
155 243 13 151 0
156 1 14 13 0
157 233 1 197 0
158 248 1 13 1
159 247 11 13 0
160 1 0 122 0
161 1 6 13 0
162 242 8 86 0
163 1 11 177 0
164 234 8 161 0
165 234 0 152 0
166 243 9 66 0
167 235 4 13 0
168 249 0 213 0
169 247 1 112 0
170 1 1 184 0
171 253 15 13 0
172 1 6 13 0
173 233 5 224 0
174 246 0 13 1
175 1 8 236 0
176 244 1 85 0
177 233 8 13 0
178 1 1 125 0
179 1 0 153 0
180 1 14 89 0
181 243 1 121 0
182 240 8 222 0
183 1 1 133 0
184 237 1 81 0
185 1 9 163 0
186 1 1 80 0
187 246 1 209 0
188 246 1 166 0
189 250 1 132 0
190 239 11 203 0





191 1 11 109 0
192 238 5 13 2
193 245 8 150 0
194 1 5 188 0
195 233 5 13 2
196 241 10 180 0
197 1 1 117 0
198 236 5 13 2
199 248 1 13 1
200 1 1 191 0
201 1 1 196 0
202 249 8 13 0
203 235 1 207 0
204 1 9 13 0
205 1 14 205 0
206 1 16 252 0
207 250 1 13 1
208 254 12 13 0
209 1 1 107 0
210 251 0 74 0
211 1 1 90 0
212 1 1 99 0
213 249 1 13 1
214 249 5 100 0
215 237 1 60 0
216 247 8 13 0
217 235 13 13 0
218 1 1 232 0
219 251 1 109 0
220 1 1 247 0
221 1 13 169 0
222 1 11 13 0
223 249 1 13 1
224 233 13 13 0
225 1 16 13 0
226 253 1 160 0
227 1 7 179 0
228 1 8 13 0
229 237 8 72 0
230 1 11 185 0
231 1 1 109 0
232 252 1 13 1
233 245 1 187 0
234 1 1 185 0
235 1 16 13 0
236 1 12 13 0
237 1 11 195 0
238 245 16 13 0





239 1 1 153 0
240 252 1 217 0
241 245 7 82 0
242 251 1 13 1
243 1 1 200 0
244 1 1 113 0
245 233 12 13 0
246 1 1 147 0
247 1 11 13 0
248 1 11 13 0
249 1 10 13 0
250 238 10 86 0
251 253 1 13 1
252 1 1 103 0
253 254 9 13 0
254 1 14 206 0
255 242 16 84 0
256 250 10 13 0
257 254 10 144 0
258 1 1 156 0
259 250 12 225 0
260 1 4 13 0
261 247 1 189 0
262 254 1 13 1
263 1 1 200 0
264 1 6 13 0
265 252 1 13 1
266 1 8 13 0
267 247 9 174 0
268 241 9 217 0
269 239 7 162 0
270 241 1 181 0
271 1 6 13 0
272 246 1 249 0
273 250 16 198 0
274 1 9 102 0
275 254 12 13 0
276 238 12 13 0
277 1 1 117 0
278 251 10 13 0
279 1 13 13 0
280 1 13 13 0
281 235 0 95 0
282 1 1 90 0
283 236 1 180 0
284 1 10 13 0
285 252 9 13 0
286 249 7 13 0






287 254 0 254 0
288 244 6 194 0
289 236 1 13 1
290 1 10 13 0
291 1 1 218 0
292 1 0 138 0
293 251 14 155 0
294 1 8 13 0
295 1 15 176 0
296 250 1 185 0
297 1 13 220 0
298 1 1 221 0
299 1 12 64 0
300 1 1 167 0
301 241 16 13 0
302 234 10 216 0
303 248 8 173 0
304 254 0 218 0
305 238 1 148 0
306 1 1 254 0
307 234 1 102 0
308 239 1 153 0
309 251 1 13 1
310 240 1 174 0
311 1 7 13 0
312 247 10 191 0
313 237 1 101 0
314 1 1 66 0
315 238 1 13 1
316 252 1 76 0
317 245 5 197 0
318 1 7 127 0
319 239 1 84 0
320 1 7 13 0
321 254 1 13 1
322 235 13 235 0
323 247 12 13 0
324 240 1 13 1
325 235 13 13 0
326 1 0 244 0
327 245 1 13 1
328 241 8 13 0
329 248 10 96 0
330 236 1 165 0
331 247 6 13 0
332 241 1 13 1
333 1 1 230 0
334 1 8 13 0





335 233 13 147 0
336 240 15 13 0
337 237 16 13 0
338 1 1 107 0
339 251 1 62 0
340 1 1 255 0
341 1 14 248 0
342 242 1 200 0
343 247 1 57 0
344 1 1 106 0
345 1 12 13 0
346 1 1 152 0
347 1 1 83 0
348 254 1 107 0
349 236 14 212 0
350 244 7 13 0
351 1 15 13 0
352 253 1 153 0
353 252 1 13 1
354 1 10 13 0
355 237 1 181 0
356 233 1 13 1
357 1 11 115 0
358 242 1 111 0
359 234 4 181 0
360 1 16 13 0
361 1 1 148 0
362 238 12 165 0
363 1 11 195 0
364 241 1 183 0
365 244 12 13 0
366 240 1 13 1
367 250 8 13 0
368 252 13 13 0
369 1 10 118 0
370 1 11 210 0
371 240 13 128 0
372 1 10 108 0
373 240 5 248 0
374 244 10 13 0
375 248 1 13 1
376 1 0 245 0
377 1 1 85 0
378 241 1 13 1
379 249 14 13 0
380 248 8 240 0
381 243 1 13 1
382 1 5 214 0





383 244 6 13 0
384 244 4 211 0
385 253 16 13 0
386 240 1 13 1
387 1 4 13 0
388 1 0 13 0
389 1 1 249 0
390 247 1 13 1
391 1 8 13 0
392 1 6 163 0
393 240 1 13 1
394 1 9 55 0
395 250 1 13 1
396 234 1 13 1
397 253 1 13 1
398 240 6 69 0
399 1 1 55 0
400 1 1 108 0
401 1 15 219 0
402 1 16 13 0
403 1 6 13 0
404 1 10 13 0
405 1 1 78 0
406 1 15 13 0
407 254 5 13 2
408 249 13 225 0
409 240 1 13 1
410 1 6 13 0
411 253 1 126 0
412 1 9 192 0
413 1 11 13 0
414 1 1 199 0
415 252 1 67 0
416 1 15 13 0
417 240 1 13 1
418 1 1 131 0
419 249 1 114 0
420 1 8 201 0
421 1 13 13 0
422 1 10 88 0
423 1 12 140 0
424 252 1 13 1
425 233 1 138 0
426 1 1 102 0
427 1 6 139 0
428 246 14 192 0
429 1 13 137 0
430 248 8 242 0






431 237 16 97 0
432 1 7 84 0
433 235 7 81 0
434 234 8 149 0
435 233 9 13 0
436 242 9 78 0
437 1 12 13 0
438 236 0 13 1
439 248 1 13 1
440 245 1 121 0
441 245 5 156 0
442 245 16 13 0
443 1 8 176 0
444 1 10 13 0
445 240 15 164 0
446 1 1 184 0
447 248 1 13 1
448 1 1 167 0
449 251 1 13 1
450 1 16 13 0
451 235 6 69 0
452 242 1 210 0
453 249 11 13 0
454 242 1 97 0
455 1 5 211 0
456 1 1 93 0
457 233 15 223 0
458 241 1 157 0
459 1 12 13 0
460 1 1 151 0
461 250 1 13 1
462 1 1 91 0
463 240 16 223 0
464 1 4 13 0
465 1 1 72 0
466 239 1 13 1
467 1 1 223 0
468 1 16 169 0
469 234 9 192 0
470 236 7 13 0
471 247 1 13 1
472 248 7 13 0
473 1 1 104 0
474 233 11 144 0
475 1 15 87 0
476 1 8 13 0
477 1 8 13 0
478 241 10 13 0





479 1 1 148 0
480 247 1 129 0
481 1 15 13 0
482 1 12 229 0
483 1 14 13 0
484 252 1 13 1
485 235 15 253 0
486 239 1 84 0
487 253 12 13 0
488 233 1 183 0
489 247 1 13 1
490 1 4 13 0
491 1 0 98 0
492 1 1 161 0
493 253 8 73 0
494 236 10 13 0
495 1 6 13 0
496 249 1 148 0
497 1 6 60 0
498 235 1 13 1
499 234 1 180 0
500 254 10 13 0
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D.2 Scenario 2
The following subsections contain the randomized test messages described in Ex-
periment 2 Scenario 2 (Section 4.3.3.2). The Behavior column (Beh) indicates the







Test Len Params Beh
1 5 245 86 216 206 182 2
2 6 20 197 139 6 122 92 2
3 5 63 225 68 91 42 0
4 1 215 0
5 6 40 163 251 120 133 183 0
6 5 183 148 13 115 108 2
7 1 163 0
8 5 111 95 236 140 20 2
9 1 169 0
10 6 214 186 230 128 63 35 0
11 5 0 181 37 160 5 2
12 4 52 33 154 151 0
13 4 55 50 251 27 0
14 2 134 43 2
15 6 122 78 92 198 2 37 2
16 2 31 44 2
17 2 40 45 2
18 4 224 194 166 183 0
19 1 120 0
20 6 56 153 243 100 166 241 0
21 4 76 191 171 205 2
22 2 120 59 2
23 2 88 58 2
24 5 72 235 20 26 239 0
25 3 19 159 54 2
26 3 140 26 165 2
27 4 175 250 216 150 0
28 5 235 163 218 186 172 0
29 6 234 132 247 158 37 216 0
30 2 176 129 2
31 4 45 229 56 145 2
32 5 15 229 42 97 245 2
33 6 223 195 111 85 43 40 0
34 6 35 76 110 139 127 231 0
35 6 18 162 217 9 46 138 0
36 4 128 86 142 73 2
37 4 93 148 4 7 2
38 6 13 146 233 105 120 154 0
39 5 193 187 49 201 167 0
40 3 251 56 145 0
41 1 230 0
42 4 4 224 235 75 0
43 2 105 73 2
44 3 103 85 175 2
45 5 7 97 19 204 68 0
46 2 34 175 2
47 2 75 233 2
Continued . . .
Test Len Params Beh
48 3 70 213 168 2
49 2 84 95 2
50 1 220 0
51 1 153 0
52 4 74 37 173 247 2
53 1 69 0
54 2 55 247 2
55 6 115 31 82 246 80 67 2
56 2 80 167 2
57 1 100 0
58 2 184 149 2
59 5 181 86 130 131 41 2
60 1 90 0
61 4 182 241 192 21 0
62 4 16 8 102 134 0
63 5 11 196 82 64 89 2
64 4 37 204 153 147 2
65 5 114 208 65 92 183 0
66 6 131 62 85 119 189 83 2
67 2 219 32 0
68 6 163 18 180 132 223 134 0
69 1 207 0
70 4 72 134 205 41 2
71 2 42 149 2
72 5 193 46 213 32 140 2
73 5 224 56 102 37 232 0
74 3 64 233 130 0
75 2 39 137 2
76 5 146 3 21 68 16 0
77 5 65 233 11 133 106 0
78 5 109 1 155 236 16 0
79 6 126 116 118 26 161 161 0
80 6 134 71 243 192 1 127 2
81 1 84 0
82 4 90 208 101 182 0
83 5 102 51 15 240 137 0
84 6 8 58 72 177 204 249 0
85 6 41 172 129 0 181 228 0
86 4 55 92 111 240 2
87 6 108 144 63 48 63 61 0
88 2 93 36 2
89 3 22 199 75 2
90 2 23 234 2
91 3 107 255 128 2
92 2 201 17 2
93 2 17 208 0
94 5 11 41 76 45 182 0
95 5 80 10 137 214 134 0
Continued . . .
Test Len Params Beh
96 6 48 16 39 4 76 183 0
97 6 102 5 209 159 93 12 2
98 4 112 92 116 51 2
99 4 160 168 55 171 0
100 6 32 221 165 8 141 129 2
101 6 52 101 98 200 81 28 2
102 3 121 184 58 0
103 1 157 0
104 3 190 129 243 0
105 6 37 181 213 128 36 72 2
106 5 152 52 119 244 145 2
107 2 22 124 2
108 3 209 87 7 2
109 6 110 32 77 27 200 67 0
110 1 208 0
111 2 194 219 2
112 4 230 94 157 32 2
113 6 52 145 147 239 143 182 0
114 3 36 14 8 2
115 5 71 199 95 96 117 2
116 4 190 144 3 48 0
117 3 209 25 211 0
118 4 192 68 47 223 2
119 3 59 82 27 2
120 5 109 227 85 134 203 0
121 3 214 183 138 2
122 2 53 163 2
123 6 97 189 196 19 149 215 2
124 4 91 114 89 159 0
125 5 207 253 171 13 156 2
126 1 107 0
127 6 78 28 144 232 43 2 0
128 4 248 193 229 2 0
129 1 88 0
130 3 218 74 145 2
131 5 110 81 123 253 224 0
132 4 86 241 102 150 0
133 5 63 174 17 18 243 2
134 1 111 0
135 4 42 140 15 218 2
136 3 230 125 79 2
137 3 213 114 202 2
138 6 165 71 149 208 238 7 2
139 4 251 231 134 26 2
140 1 193 0
141 2 77 25 2
142 2 91 124 2
143 1 176 0
Continued . . .
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Test Len Params Beh
144 2 222 135 2
145 2 29 144 0
146 6 42 211 212 18 37 216 0
147 5 245 250 53 54 193 0
148 2 240 248 0
149 1 82 0
150 1 214 0
151 2 236 45 2
152 4 49 251 7 77 2
153 1 129 0
154 3 232 187 135 2
155 4 157 142 95 225 2
156 2 130 29 2
157 2 171 11 2
158 3 14 137 7 0
159 5 255 119 137 87 247 2
160 5 159 159 113 37 47 2
161 2 70 213 2
162 3 41 238 231 2
163 3 50 164 188 2
164 6 238 80 13 255 58 209 0
165 1 151 0
166 3 193 8 23 0
167 4 185 97 228 38 0
168 2 232 67 2
169 4 240 71 231 172 2
170 3 153 163 157 2
171 5 209 216 85 171 48 0
172 2 149 214 2
173 5 80 61 229 104 24 2
174 6 224 16 169 164 93 153 0
175 6 131 174 176 75 187 9 2
176 3 219 98 36 2
177 1 142 0
178 3 169 87 30 2
179 6 212 163 139 56 91 47 0
180 6 28 77 84 135 44 139 2
181 3 6 42 62 2
182 1 118 0
183 5 76 87 30 46 126 2
184 4 71 65 104 227 0
185 2 158 83 2
186 3 148 248 64 0
187 4 226 220 38 85 2
188 6 165 232 164 86 23 163 0
189 6 33 179 158 77 44 247 0
190 1 35 0
191 1 113 0
Continued . . .
Test Len Params Beh
192 5 47 189 41 202 233 2
193 5 158 197 197 40 41 2
194 4 121 197 207 155 2
195 6 44 207 41 156 214 243 2
196 2 72 197 2
197 2 109 61 2
198 3 69 175 212 2
199 3 173 92 14 2
200 2 172 35 2
201 4 85 130 150 212 0
202 3 238 1 100 0
203 4 228 224 227 79 0
204 2 28 22 2
205 2 184 0 0
206 2 236 173 2
207 1 207 0
208 2 52 198 2
209 2 121 136 0
210 1 142 0
211 5 158 245 203 222 145 2
212 2 235 35 2
213 5 17 26 138 80 237 0
214 4 120 54 195 8 2
215 3 242 34 189 2
216 6 138 7 80 31 177 238 2
217 5 220 11 146 209 239 0
218 4 82 187 185 172 2
219 3 129 50 10 2
220 6 73 5 254 21 47 215 2
221 5 177 75 71 135 3 0
222 3 46 145 174 0
223 6 147 8 62 211 102 10 0
224 1 82 0
225 5 143 72 61 141 105 0
226 2 87 52 2
227 2 5 232 0
228 1 83 0
229 1 55 0
230 1 93 0
231 4 110 147 101 22 2
232 3 19 122 243 2
233 1 62 0
234 1 235 0
235 4 139 65 143 117 0
236 2 65 209 2
237 3 111 192 68 0
238 3 200 4 130 2
239 5 24 171 245 14 60 0
Continued . . .
Test Len Params Beh
240 2 225 167 2
241 1 209 0
242 6 111 191 241 13 188 79 2
243 6 241 80 229 33 154 193 0
244 3 71 129 20 0
245 3 97 109 120 2
246 1 80 0
247 6 245 139 184 140 74 80 0
248 6 9 39 103 113 30 228 2
249 2 37 99 2
250 1 74 0
251 5 73 174 124 1 23 2
252 1 154 0
253 1 138 0
254 2 147 207 2
255 5 63 220 141 93 192 2
256 3 239 213 0 2
257 1 135 0
258 1 66 0
259 1 87 0
260 2 202 195 2
261 3 3 201 10 0
262 6 179 111 15 118 219 70 2
263 2 219 242 2
264 2 200 21 2
265 2 237 42 2
266 2 209 176 0
267 5 148 161 191 39 241 0
268 2 231 167 2
269 3 64 224 63 0
270 2 107 224 0
271 4 186 224 16 237 0
272 4 58 25 103 233 0
273 2 122 227 2
274 2 177 134 2
275 1 32 0
276 6 143 184 244 137 146 138 0
277 5 144 141 249 132 74 2
278 5 108 195 44 47 188 0
279 5 251 237 124 236 63 2
280 6 105 119 178 250 116 13 2
281 3 28 44 176 2
282 4 150 72 71 154 0
283 2 126 250 2
284 3 170 166 189 2
285 4 159 69 56 75 2
286 1 99 0
287 2 215 236 2
Continued . . .
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Test Len Params Beh
288 2 93 222 2
289 5 133 47 169 200 205 2
290 3 198 167 14 2
291 5 150 185 61 71 53 0
292 6 42 116 149 104 187 88 0
293 5 232 42 83 15 12 0
294 2 16 204 2
295 1 75 0
296 6 62 84 215 243 213 168 0
297 5 126 165 7 91 137 2
298 2 35 68 2
299 4 102 209 207 140 0
300 6 171 12 109 234 10 53 0
301 2 212 92 2
302 3 152 163 232 2
303 4 244 195 75 188 2
304 2 83 243 2
305 4 192 93 29 195 2
306 5 50 90 65 57 111 0
307 2 59 79 2
308 1 110 0
309 4 124 71 120 13 2
310 5 212 242 149 45 20 0
311 6 201 95 174 133 78 195 2
312 1 190 0
313 5 39 212 109 73 152 2
314 6 130 53 68 28 62 238 2
315 6 198 176 184 10 80 84 0
316 2 65 101 2
317 5 77 168 188 95 241 0
318 3 186 157 28 2
319 6 202 9 88 73 35 108 0
320 1 150 0
321 6 123 50 186 241 149 79 0
322 1 210 0
323 1 39 0
324 6 131 141 33 130 108 167 2
325 5 222 30 230 103 35 2
326 6 97 8 224 47 20 23 0
327 4 236 79 243 121 2
328 3 31 108 223 2
329 4 251 110 140 241 2
330 3 109 129 85 0
331 6 127 214 12 215 16 161 2
332 3 131 108 2 2
333 1 230 0
334 5 35 128 117 181 208 0
335 1 238 0
Continued . . .
Test Len Params Beh
336 3 174 134 203 2
337 5 101 10 31 159 198 0
338 2 236 147 2
339 5 63 120 211 44 137 0
340 4 13 129 100 3 0
341 4 221 241 139 253 0
342 1 94 0
343 6 175 120 18 3 193 124 0
344 1 133 0
345 5 194 40 15 89 28 0
346 3 195 234 215 2
347 2 212 214 2
348 6 214 249 176 55 255 225 0
349 5 178 172 195 237 222 2
350 5 44 3 236 57 183 0
351 3 98 181 166 2
352 3 87 190 191 2
353 2 240 100 2
354 4 253 190 18 4 2
355 5 28 216 38 147 137 0
356 1 207 0
357 1 145 0
358 1 236 0
359 2 112 71 2
360 2 16 116 2
361 5 135 209 71 219 175 0
362 3 152 186 12 2
363 2 49 73 2
364 1 254 0
365 4 213 168 193 15 0
366 1 180 0
367 5 164 14 170 164 134 2
368 3 227 61 246 2
369 6 152 6 205 52 215 20 2
370 1 174 0
371 6 144 237 211 54 18 97 2
372 3 162 185 231 0
373 2 195 227 2
374 3 215 153 125 0
375 6 245 177 17 91 104 141 0
376 2 150 88 0
377 6 11 51 141 72 196 227 0
378 4 14 63 133 46 2
379 4 153 192 249 197 0
380 2 22 130 2
381 2 161 70 2
382 1 159 0
383 3 247 64 214 0
Continued . . .
Test Len Params Beh
384 2 173 193 2
385 1 158 0
386 5 65 180 35 61 234 2
387 6 71 120 162 101 59 157 0
388 5 188 181 171 254 228 2
389 6 137 63 238 180 74 200 2
390 5 189 236 108 41 247 2
391 4 68 229 51 81 2
392 4 147 20 141 163 2
393 5 239 84 101 223 188 2
394 4 168 46 235 177 2
395 2 106 103 2
396 4 189 180 59 91 2
397 2 105 91 2
398 1 86 0
399 2 78 56 0
400 3 29 86 164 2
401 3 47 5 113 2
402 1 209 0
403 1 144 0
404 5 249 198 56 20 25 2
405 2 230 176 0
406 6 238 9 165 83 221 115 0
407 3 61 112 183 0
408 5 96 238 122 198 159 2
409 1 178 0
410 5 173 70 120 41 184 2
411 4 132 190 123 11 2
412 3 9 231 190 2
413 2 219 171 2
414 3 7 250 106 2
415 4 70 83 85 60 2
416 4 84 136 38 158 0
417 5 79 177 32 49 126 0
418 4 24 185 167 224 0
419 1 115 0
420 2 249 153 2
421 2 197 190 2
422 1 64 0
423 4 81 189 127 68 2
424 3 58 83 113 2
425 1 46 0
426 3 95 254 157 2
427 5 2 46 42 156 61 2
428 3 223 38 70 2
429 4 133 53 197 38 2
430 5 109 142 82 84 183 2
431 6 109 11 161 193 138 98 0
Continued . . .
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Test Len Params Beh
432 3 28 37 250 2
433 4 204 46 114 35 2
434 5 162 125 179 74 100 2
435 3 214 174 195 2
436 4 52 226 70 180 0
437 6 164 146 77 241 72 108 0
438 6 74 187 149 46 96 49 0
439 6 241 63 47 123 205 53 2
440 5 18 216 224 203 66 0
441 4 243 155 26 107 2
442 1 76 0
443 4 58 178 17 98 0
444 2 231 52 2
445 6 34 69 83 217 141 63 2
446 6 125 157 139 185 35 190 2
447 4 212 55 245 183 2
448 2 50 162 2
449 5 145 230 247 128 94 2
450 3 29 81 177 0
451 1 70 0
452 5 95 142 94 0 166 2
453 4 102 53 151 251 2
454 4 93 240 206 71 0
455 6 40 181 45 190 39 82 2
456 3 151 191 204 2
457 5 223 102 192 147 37 2
458 2 55 188 2
459 3 178 174 208 2
460 5 99 22 172 6 146 2
461 1 6 0
462 1 62 0
463 6 218 154 117 30 198 89 0
464 5 118 117 228 254 140 2
465 3 119 105 172 0
466 3 55 109 41 2
467 4 143 21 54 179 2
468 6 198 12 183 226 186 9 0
469 6 65 243 250 23 215 223 0
470 5 182 197 64 231 30 2
471 1 49 0
472 4 48 201 79 154 0
473 5 139 65 100 174 202 0
474 1 49 0
475 1 102 0
476 2 209 132 2
477 6 199 225 95 222 178 196 0
478 4 74 149 16 243 2
479 1 110 0
Continued . . .
Test Len Params Beh
480 3 82 89 133 0
481 2 87 43 2
482 1 80 0
483 1 86 0
484 2 125 139 2
485 2 208 58 2
486 5 93 225 31 145 47 0
487 3 83 224 162 0
488 1 154 0
489 5 252 99 28 94 57 0
490 2 53 180 2
491 3 1 252 120 2
492 1 189 0
493 6 195 219 119 21 210 71 0
494 2 25 214 2
495 5 110 250 41 165 114 0
496 6 35 170 71 36 233 7 0
497 1 243 0
498 1 48 0
499 4 227 11 236 62 2
500 6 241 14 83 117 161 29 2
120
D.2.2 Dev13.
Test Len Params Beh
1 3 75 236 14 0
2 1 247 0
3 6 181 23 126 97 82 222 0
4 3 194 16 240 0
5 1 176 0
6 3 15 112 176 0
7 6 203 185 153 24 152 178 0
8 3 26 105 113 0
9 5 62 165 189 59 189 0
10 2 122 11 0
11 4 210 149 165 59 0
12 2 162 175 0
13 4 187 216 143 126 0
14 4 204 128 150 127 0
15 2 134 234 0
16 1 213 0
17 5 42 118 54 2 13 0
18 2 53 114 0
19 4 182 208 22 233 0
20 5 136 88 195 225 222 0
21 3 64 64 125 0
22 1 53 0
23 2 39 34 0
24 6 103 65 191 61 185 163 0
25 6 115 163 13 169 16 107 0
26 3 37 175 252 0
27 1 51 0
28 4 31 225 69 133 0
29 6 21 112 107 48 100 124 0
30 1 164 0
31 5 171 57 243 111 244 0
32 2 239 54 0
33 3 92 203 251 0
34 2 99 157 0
35 4 241 137 107 134 0
36 2 186 245 0
37 2 185 108 0
38 2 120 44 0
39 3 51 186 44 0
40 6 49 184 36 46 89 117 0
41 2 240 131 0
42 4 30 121 207 86 0
43 2 230 68 0
44 1 54 0
45 2 224 231 0
46 2 143 78 0
47 4 255 8 219 16 0
Continued . . .
Test Len Params Beh
48 2 24 23 0
49 6 96 147 6 218 54 178 0
50 1 201 0
51 5 115 200 152 140 56 0
52 3 226 74 214 0
53 4 155 59 164 6 0
54 3 1 227 93 0
55 2 169 54 0
56 2 39 151 0
57 2 118 85 0
58 3 139 62 190 0
59 2 207 180 0
60 6 161 145 196 207 170 187 0
61 3 13 239 172 0
62 4 166 25 11 141 0
63 2 140 104 0
64 3 79 147 207 0
65 5 150 41 9 160 173 0
66 4 191 106 121 160 0
67 6 191 165 193 67 218 162 0
68 6 178 32 69 195 218 46 0
69 2 8 156 0
70 6 141 249 242 190 142 71 0
71 3 86 179 8 0
72 2 32 160 0
73 5 209 243 215 126 23 0
74 3 199 220 197 0
75 6 170 244 65 4 111 170 0
76 6 146 254 120 176 48 79 0
77 4 84 208 24 52 0
78 4 6 223 93 113 0
79 5 190 10 9 156 89 0
80 3 157 128 186 0
81 5 192 14 238 46 21 0
82 1 180 0
83 5 12 90 118 79 120 0
84 5 132 109 32 45 6 0
85 4 0 154 47 238 0
86 4 59 58 89 254 0
87 1 67 0
88 6 194 80 139 17 250 248 0
89 5 199 201 190 214 135 0
90 1 218 0
91 1 125 0
92 4 208 49 252 101 0
93 2 141 110 0
94 5 131 1 47 57 23 0
95 1 170 0
Continued . . .
Test Len Params Beh
96 2 233 202 0
97 4 150 87 66 83 0
98 6 187 183 193 7 159 73 0
99 1 224 0
100 2 106 231 0
101 2 129 122 0
102 1 5 0
103 4 182 108 148 66 0
104 2 137 49 0
105 5 202 246 215 246 254 0
106 2 202 122 0
107 6 126 8 212 241 234 121 0
108 6 8 229 252 156 70 202 0
109 1 34 0
110 2 230 164 0
111 5 20 186 130 207 77 0
112 1 35 0
113 2 2 166 0
114 2 250 89 0
115 1 125 0
116 3 172 21 173 0
117 4 149 143 151 213 0
118 2 46 196 0
119 1 54 0
120 3 162 154 111 0
121 1 116 0
122 4 255 88 131 115 0
123 6 178 80 108 109 225 253 0
124 5 17 183 36 173 105 0
125 2 12 144 0
126 3 158 183 234 0
127 3 253 182 245 0
128 1 47 0
129 1 191 0
130 6 125 5 10 125 56 170 0
131 1 130 0
132 1 247 0
133 6 148 51 123 32 114 250 0
134 2 139 102 0
135 3 59 57 16 0
136 5 223 162 40 138 246 0
137 6 87 251 122 162 24 12 0
138 4 66 233 117 115 0
139 6 57 96 144 33 169 62 0
140 2 175 30 0
141 5 207 229 198 69 110 0
142 3 216 215 215 0
143 4 90 172 78 206 0
Continued . . .
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Test Len Params Beh
144 6 186 121 67 65 167 194 0
145 6 159 8 176 38 83 218 0
146 5 243 69 152 179 138 0
147 1 149 0
148 6 246 61 17 1 102 103 0
149 2 215 40 0
150 6 165 6 52 226 46 202 0
151 5 224 196 185 221 47 0
152 4 19 245 127 136 0
153 3 75 72 24 0
154 6 76 15 163 37 213 60 0
155 6 234 52 42 212 204 197 0
156 1 57 0
157 4 137 183 226 255 0
158 1 4 0
159 2 186 246 0
160 3 99 185 33 0
161 3 21 152 72 0
162 2 195 89 0
163 4 194 234 180 181 0
164 6 90 202 133 43 104 153 0
165 2 73 173 0
166 3 57 173 152 0
167 5 214 182 160 131 135 0
168 2 122 68 0
169 6 162 108 26 27 239 65 0
170 2 213 200 0
171 6 34 115 48 192 170 226 0
172 3 108 133 75 0
173 4 182 189 145 205 0
174 2 67 5 0
175 4 72 112 155 224 0
176 2 176 153 0
177 6 27 124 243 86 153 171 0
178 5 117 39 16 219 6 0
179 3 125 154 8 0
180 2 152 252 0
181 2 95 7 0
182 6 72 161 174 167 31 167 0
183 3 165 15 130 0
184 4 87 36 108 103 0
185 3 10 155 74 0
186 4 79 141 67 47 0
187 5 68 5 40 116 244 0
188 4 36 196 69 114 0
189 1 86 0
190 3 82 24 248 0
191 6 107 67 106 161 149 241 0
Continued . . .
Test Len Params Beh
192 3 41 246 106 0
193 5 74 239 237 11 221 0
194 4 4 246 77 145 0
195 5 63 2 177 112 75 0
196 1 102 0
197 6 217 69 151 27 192 43 0
198 1 108 0
199 2 207 101 0
200 2 152 145 0
201 6 8 50 223 47 192 65 0
202 4 104 9 137 35 0
203 4 236 249 216 60 0
204 4 102 140 136 168 0
205 5 32 71 43 23 232 0
206 4 48 127 74 135 0
207 6 58 164 205 155 235 214 0
208 1 135 0
209 3 237 19 149 0
210 3 242 130 149 0
211 4 206 200 251 86 0
212 5 122 188 208 195 233 0
213 1 246 0
214 2 188 245 0
215 4 3 97 4 98 0
216 2 227 42 0
217 6 57 239 208 106 204 241 0
218 3 212 165 91 0
219 1 48 0
220 4 104 187 39 230 0
221 1 122 0
222 6 60 183 212 136 206 143 0
223 2 122 222 0
224 5 219 98 109 36 201 0
225 2 58 233 0
226 6 25 161 185 136 194 184 0
227 5 94 119 175 127 46 0
228 6 236 70 47 228 127 71 0
229 4 27 133 73 109 0
230 6 250 251 239 105 180 184 0
231 3 121 243 136 0
232 4 123 74 207 116 0
233 4 121 250 210 249 0
234 5 240 93 35 115 21 0
235 6 216 162 171 197 50 97 0
236 6 137 66 117 67 134 123 0
237 6 29 184 174 158 38 30 0
238 3 137 166 104 0
239 1 9 0
Continued . . .
Test Len Params Beh
240 2 41 85 0
241 1 5 0
242 4 123 18 102 138 0
243 4 68 158 88 95 0
244 6 145 14 149 217 91 74 0
245 2 240 82 0
246 2 117 220 0
247 3 9 54 165 0
248 1 24 0
249 4 102 249 139 136 0
250 6 237 136 20 200 103 36 0
251 1 46 0
252 6 179 185 157 81 248 207 0
253 6 98 124 182 91 178 213 0
254 3 116 13 157 0
255 2 122 201 0
256 2 146 35 0
257 1 128 0
258 4 56 127 102 63 0
259 4 141 199 227 81 0
260 2 157 44 0
261 1 66 0
262 5 75 152 2 76 95 0
263 5 30 86 225 29 109 0
264 4 244 110 195 119 0
265 2 249 152 0
266 4 150 118 138 136 0
267 1 212 0
268 2 144 76 0
269 2 17 178 0
270 3 196 126 111 0
271 5 145 29 188 218 181 0
272 3 173 228 52 0
273 3 215 251 78 0
274 3 45 125 105 0
275 3 185 155 29 0
276 3 162 138 236 0
277 6 253 135 255 135 144 77 0
278 4 79 192 147 164 0
279 6 117 118 214 213 24 130 0
280 3 11 97 131 0
281 6 175 181 232 132 34 141 0
282 6 71 63 221 183 218 69 0
283 3 10 132 198 0
284 4 62 250 175 80 0
285 1 126 0
286 3 244 58 32 0
287 3 57 35 181 0
Continued . . .
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Test Len Params Beh
288 3 12 152 120 0
289 6 184 248 222 237 42 21 0
290 6 55 186 165 72 212 120 0
291 2 140 174 0
292 5 183 97 218 255 69 0
293 2 40 140 0
294 5 195 81 124 135 79 0
295 4 3 126 212 234 0
296 1 104 0
297 2 245 56 0
298 2 189 150 0
299 2 134 19 0
300 3 246 20 148 0
301 2 62 203 0
302 2 200 87 0
303 3 17 91 151 0
304 4 93 153 173 79 0
305 4 93 253 23 39 0
306 1 96 0
307 3 233 181 40 0
308 2 82 113 0
309 1 144 0
310 6 250 228 175 213 127 6 0
311 6 108 116 50 200 49 235 0
312 6 161 85 67 62 150 82 0
313 6 165 243 243 125 91 103 0
314 1 213 0
315 2 64 30 0
316 1 243 0
317 1 46 0
318 3 227 162 193 0
319 6 3 0 4 56 37 199 0
320 1 44 0
321 4 174 92 80 240 0
322 6 103 162 214 107 188 61 0
323 3 204 92 94 0
324 2 214 141 0
325 1 50 0
326 5 213 222 43 11 144 0
327 2 55 247 0
328 2 110 41 0
329 1 194 0
330 5 77 167 72 45 2 0
331 6 239 166 209 8 92 13 0
332 2 138 55 0
333 3 117 117 119 0
334 6 58 4 135 5 178 91 0
335 4 249 231 43 16 0
Continued . . .
Test Len Params Beh
336 4 217 109 152 90 0
337 3 52 223 7 0
338 2 33 164 0
339 2 201 178 0
340 5 193 193 22 54 173 0
341 2 211 39 0
342 2 150 93 0
343 4 143 90 88 82 0
344 5 129 124 194 31 177 0
345 3 51 170 95 0
346 1 169 0
347 1 42 0
348 1 149 0
349 4 226 229 197 194 0
350 6 193 25 234 13 171 132 0
351 6 240 190 91 111 86 125 0
352 2 42 207 0
353 5 52 226 71 37 208 0
354 6 118 92 46 52 65 88 0
355 1 37 0
356 3 196 194 189 0
357 2 142 195 0
358 3 116 110 122 0
359 6 224 208 31 123 210 70 0
360 6 225 199 162 101 19 49 0
361 3 16 149 199 0
362 3 101 19 213 0
363 1 177 0
364 2 193 1 0
365 1 110 0
366 6 87 103 117 4 63 15 0
367 3 70 164 6 0
368 3 98 62 29 0
369 3 136 210 168 0
370 2 207 72 0
371 3 97 66 27 0
372 3 95 80 39 0
373 2 192 53 0
374 5 215 236 79 152 68 0
375 6 74 53 101 117 107 181 0
376 3 242 153 249 0
377 5 166 49 182 162 204 0
378 5 222 39 139 10 18 0
379 2 217 204 0
380 4 25 15 110 96 0
381 1 167 0
382 6 124 148 234 6 30 249 0
383 5 26 56 242 198 5 0
Continued . . .
Test Len Params Beh
384 2 136 255 0
385 6 107 177 77 148 7 100 0
386 1 58 0
387 1 44 0
388 5 39 49 196 79 1 0
389 3 84 244 225 0
390 6 1 243 74 179 28 2 0
391 5 142 43 168 21 70 0
392 6 180 139 244 165 16 217 0
393 3 73 135 82 0
394 6 110 155 69 37 161 83 0
395 5 168 116 40 57 3 0
396 6 209 87 198 49 82 252 0
397 2 141 46 0
398 4 228 187 45 223 0
399 1 56 0
400 2 221 221 0
401 2 201 108 0
402 2 78 24 0
403 2 213 3 0
404 5 87 169 188 226 29 0
405 3 101 187 3 0
406 3 221 81 211 0
407 4 150 36 45 6 0
408 6 156 58 143 134 110 236 0
409 5 5 43 246 113 83 0
410 3 44 220 255 0
411 2 82 29 0
412 5 186 231 83 243 240 0
413 2 47 202 0
414 1 48 0
415 4 109 5 119 178 0
416 5 209 254 171 233 21 0
417 6 39 151 0 145 130 204 0
418 4 33 174 217 98 0
419 5 124 96 135 121 221 0
420 3 30 254 162 0
421 4 209 171 62 119 0
422 4 243 189 248 200 0
423 4 135 176 170 138 0
424 4 224 170 59 91 0
425 4 92 143 155 141 0
426 6 242 69 140 95 222 210 0
427 6 29 229 27 250 44 161 0
428 2 116 81 0
429 4 146 61 34 176 0
430 3 42 95 224 0
431 4 82 216 70 22 0
Continued . . .
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432 3 226 20 123 0
433 1 245 0
434 2 127 92 0
435 4 19 129 254 243 0
436 5 47 238 156 65 29 0
437 5 42 156 195 87 154 0
438 4 48 112 248 179 0
439 2 239 17 0
440 4 115 157 177 197 0
441 5 155 212 99 204 136 0
442 3 237 220 214 0
443 1 26 0
444 2 125 77 0
445 2 162 65 0
446 1 62 0
447 2 128 7 0
448 6 4 15 235 34 127 110 0
449 6 81 88 236 254 179 242 0
450 2 116 88 0
451 6 5 30 123 0 112 192 0
452 5 79 225 137 239 45 0
453 5 135 71 68 161 188 0
454 4 75 69 173 220 0
455 5 109 202 247 56 20 0
456 4 182 185 120 231 0
457 2 69 14 0
458 4 55 149 154 136 0
459 1 139 0
460 6 232 117 224 142 30 106 0
461 5 179 197 184 132 171 0
462 6 53 3 68 117 115 142 0
463 5 140 110 201 177 119 0
464 2 245 244 0
465 6 250 97 233 207 102 214 0
466 5 167 224 178 179 114 0
467 6 176 83 56 204 137 197 0
468 3 63 123 116 0
469 3 125 86 186 0
470 6 212 62 105 247 70 12 0
471 6 234 132 214 203 180 31 0
472 3 186 93 196 0
473 2 217 53 0
474 6 121 255 195 31 79 105 0
475 3 119 230 174 0
476 1 113 0
477 2 19 224 0
478 3 200 178 188 0
479 4 23 139 213 58 0
Continued . . .
Test Len Params Beh
480 6 77 108 215 201 164 195 0
481 1 195 0
482 3 251 170 134 0
483 6 63 90 178 30 253 92 0
484 5 246 244 60 71 86 0
485 3 91 101 128 0
486 3 82 96 48 0
487 6 225 250 104 32 16 90 0
488 4 158 99 35 148 0
489 6 111 46 208 87 64 94 0
490 2 68 76 0
491 4 165 16 184 131 0
492 6 73 190 249 152 143 155 0
493 2 45 253 0
494 6 243 126 139 113 135 119 0
495 5 123 84 199 182 93 0
496 4 203 239 226 13 0
497 6 152 249 175 201 247 104 0
498 3 247 43 171 0
499 4 189 7 199 183 0
500 4 127 36 200 31 0
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D.2.3 Dev15.
Test Len Params Beh
1 2 28 19 0
2 6 240 235 154 55 113 69 0
3 3 223 72 203 0
4 4 56 70 42 103 0
5 5 250 253 70 22 17 0
6 1 59 0
7 4 38 64 162 202 0
8 4 157 51 236 63 0
9 2 59 109 0
10 4 157 82 172 150 0
11 6 71 49 42 222 197 3 0
12 6 61 9 14 2 59 251 0
13 4 31 248 159 221 0
14 2 189 136 0
15 6 217 178 141 96 189 12 0
16 4 215 247 179 114 0
17 5 226 157 190 3 222 0
18 3 177 124 40 0
19 6 131 73 143 47 178 29 0
20 2 212 44 0
21 5 105 155 133 223 192 0
22 3 145 44 30 0
23 3 46 136 179 0
24 4 12 141 73 49 0
25 3 190 3 44 0
26 6 199 177 38 133 95 217 0
27 1 52 0
28 6 96 126 56 138 32 116 0
29 1 80 0
30 3 142 224 91 0
31 6 242 66 44 209 13 232 0
32 6 87 180 134 75 168 179 0
33 6 150 35 12 45 51 11 0
34 4 61 3 17 113 0
35 3 135 231 36 0
36 5 78 217 48 42 87 0
37 3 150 170 148 0
38 1 221 0
39 1 237 0
40 6 135 12 167 130 54 144 0
41 1 1 0
42 5 94 14 107 74 88 0
43 2 46 139 0
44 5 29 244 193 10 47 0
45 2 173 31 0
46 4 128 145 8 150 0
47 2 178 68 0
Continued . . .
Test Len Params Beh
48 6 224 78 176 214 13 5 0
49 2 130 95 0
50 1 93 0
51 6 64 187 60 249 3 86 0
52 2 170 223 0
53 4 184 220 156 244 0
54 2 151 146 0
55 6 234 171 206 71 7 61 0
56 6 94 192 102 93 241 141 0
57 5 65 251 122 118 221 0
58 1 14 0
59 2 78 227 0
60 6 186 215 110 7 217 140 0
61 5 208 191 63 4 3 0
62 5 129 46 55 235 101 0
63 4 42 160 130 177 0
64 3 178 92 89 0
65 1 121 0
66 6 44 148 61 77 84 255 0
67 5 227 57 196 109 103 0
68 4 146 109 161 11 0
69 4 26 115 70 246 0
70 6 36 4 130 175 138 198 0
71 3 87 248 121 0
72 5 108 79 143 20 235 0
73 1 83 0
74 5 32 161 60 187 31 0
75 2 91 65 0
76 4 210 61 60 79 0
77 3 236 96 222 0
78 6 99 169 178 169 112 105 0
79 5 69 171 200 81 131 0
80 4 246 100 104 236 0
81 3 109 193 214 0
82 1 228 0
83 6 224 131 105 114 174 77 0
84 4 175 249 12 66 0
85 5 109 11 120 117 59 0
86 5 222 148 209 53 143 0
87 1 179 0
88 6 103 149 85 236 100 210 0
89 1 214 0
90 3 31 10 125 0
91 5 151 159 108 223 97 0
92 1 143 0
93 6 146 18 100 235 17 187 0
94 2 177 37 0
95 5 119 123 10 249 214 0
Continued . . .
Test Len Params Beh
96 3 96 217 150 0
97 1 215 0
98 3 192 92 238 0
99 4 18 109 11 81 0
100 3 36 253 39 0
101 1 18 0
102 3 210 137 176 0
103 6 93 56 66 250 137 99 0
104 5 14 152 96 170 160 0
105 3 9 171 47 0
106 6 174 28 10 18 127 187 0
107 1 240 0
108 5 115 96 41 254 114 0
109 5 143 195 72 49 12 0
110 6 17 180 67 251 37 180 0
111 1 188 0
112 6 48 61 247 126 124 210 0
113 6 210 238 112 192 210 79 0
114 4 121 46 206 148 0
115 6 86 118 7 41 222 124 0
116 4 60 97 3 151 0
117 6 205 238 166 50 168 40 0
118 5 208 200 229 74 31 0
119 5 152 167 134 182 197 0
120 6 140 148 180 251 46 146 0
121 5 178 115 220 141 6 0
122 4 111 110 112 142 0
123 5 175 171 249 248 253 0
124 2 100 48 0
125 3 227 64 157 0
126 1 88 0
127 6 76 109 226 16 236 147 0
128 1 235 0
129 4 91 14 8 255 0
130 3 156 56 132 0
131 6 80 90 34 179 14 116 0
132 6 84 198 177 123 52 47 0
133 2 1 144 0
134 4 59 198 32 170 0
135 5 202 108 135 94 149 0
136 1 91 0
137 6 151 111 54 56 16 142 0
138 4 169 163 50 98 0
139 6 12 131 165 77 12 240 0
140 1 173 0
141 4 181 12 82 25 0
142 3 219 74 63 0
143 3 227 167 19 0
Continued . . .
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144 4 67 161 68 204 0
145 2 207 222 0
146 2 234 182 0
147 4 229 242 212 32 0
148 1 34 0
149 5 115 110 39 9 232 0
150 6 79 68 233 255 157 86 0
151 6 201 36 137 108 182 225 0
152 3 82 174 216 0
153 3 98 114 20 0
154 1 99 0
155 1 239 0
156 1 18 0
157 5 118 38 239 164 212 0
158 5 231 215 172 254 54 0
159 6 36 214 50 87 113 142 0
160 5 17 40 152 120 30 0
161 5 26 51 219 133 111 0
162 5 230 55 71 129 221 0
163 4 78 207 171 114 0
164 6 255 238 68 98 120 230 0
165 2 35 187 0
166 5 113 254 160 39 234 0
167 3 139 180 79 0
168 6 219 118 77 5 38 95 0
169 6 58 172 10 12 42 10 0
170 4 82 102 55 252 0
171 6 255 2 31 14 209 170 0
172 3 67 94 196 0
173 1 41 0
174 2 58 167 0
175 5 0 43 135 28 106 0
176 1 94 0
177 2 119 10 0
178 3 163 51 203 0
179 1 205 0
180 2 46 125 0
181 3 132 185 123 0
182 2 77 127 0
183 3 127 137 50 0
184 2 147 49 0
185 6 32 39 251 114 152 4 0
186 3 43 73 78 0
187 1 88 0
188 1 248 0
189 6 124 45 87 103 173 3 0
190 2 206 198 0
191 6 226 98 21 112 91 151 0
Continued . . .
Test Len Params Beh
192 6 39 203 207 67 224 86 0
193 1 147 0
194 1 50 0
195 5 94 82 69 9 171 0
196 5 119 55 199 44 198 0
197 6 218 197 226 214 81 38 0
198 1 222 0
199 5 215 134 41 44 194 0
200 6 161 178 209 113 169 188 0
201 1 181 0
202 1 255 0
203 5 154 205 143 33 93 0
204 2 177 53 0
205 5 195 195 137 62 205 0
206 5 51 69 204 224 52 0
207 6 122 78 77 238 65 104 0
208 6 22 236 81 82 220 141 0
209 3 252 60 131 0
210 5 191 98 111 61 79 0
211 4 92 202 238 236 0
212 4 235 31 95 104 0
213 5 121 63 145 215 208 0
214 2 229 135 0
215 3 60 252 241 0
216 1 81 0
217 6 193 145 150 9 239 125 0
218 5 58 177 16 104 244 0
219 4 62 132 123 99 0
220 6 69 217 153 169 177 179 0
221 3 225 49 209 0
222 2 83 26 0
223 4 81 243 147 196 0
224 4 210 75 78 70 0
225 1 6 0
226 3 206 117 97 0
227 3 164 149 11 0
228 2 221 163 0
229 3 176 51 104 0
230 2 236 117 0
231 5 142 97 132 187 141 0
232 1 59 0
233 2 13 11 0
234 6 211 92 175 119 50 77 0
235 4 18 44 200 219 0
236 1 242 0
237 1 195 0
238 6 111 252 228 238 29 153 0
239 6 242 221 176 222 22 38 0
Continued . . .
Test Len Params Beh
240 6 41 32 27 41 46 120 0
241 2 2 18 0
242 2 47 217 0
243 1 12 0
244 5 152 214 87 207 186 0
245 2 22 79 0
246 3 212 46 128 0
247 5 80 12 114 68 158 0
248 6 174 46 90 238 221 144 0
249 2 62 165 0
250 2 37 166 0
251 4 16 235 116 137 0
252 1 45 0
253 4 175 135 173 253 0
254 5 4 214 121 58 148 0
255 5 208 97 87 117 183 0
256 2 61 44 0
257 3 168 2 162 0
258 6 158 35 88 138 193 72 0
259 2 63 125 0
260 5 106 77 89 122 94 0
261 4 214 43 245 183 0
262 4 45 32 53 197 0
263 4 19 41 131 107 0
264 5 8 171 178 46 37 0
265 6 220 250 118 179 66 218 0
266 6 208 78 218 91 18 60 0
267 6 9 124 77 15 45 15 0
268 6 32 35 1 253 249 25 0
269 5 222 10 13 219 212 0
270 1 169 0
271 3 178 234 84 0
272 1 204 0
273 2 67 60 0
274 5 43 246 57 248 23 0
275 5 254 16 232 79 54 0
276 1 14 0
277 3 141 77 174 0
278 1 99 0
279 6 69 109 62 7 35 106 0
280 6 173 248 176 141 76 196 0
281 3 81 108 108 0
282 4 112 127 243 59 0
283 3 230 82 53 0
284 4 195 255 80 152 0
285 5 100 71 172 160 142 0
286 4 54 175 146 198 0
287 1 210 0
Continued . . .
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288 3 194 68 60 0
289 3 185 4 57 0
290 6 83 189 98 134 35 94 0
291 6 167 220 77 205 60 150 0
292 5 164 129 113 23 75 0
293 4 68 54 62 227 0
294 5 145 93 38 52 48 0
295 5 16 56 184 215 2 0
296 4 63 1 240 4 0
297 1 195 0
298 3 176 69 104 0
299 5 11 142 77 127 58 0
300 1 104 0
301 1 208 0
302 2 240 26 0
303 1 16 0
304 2 17 82 0
305 6 64 4 192 55 144 171 0
306 6 129 234 12 31 128 179 0
307 6 126 160 144 80 251 59 0
308 2 143 31 0
309 4 84 42 131 18 0
310 4 145 210 49 6 0
311 3 173 252 35 0
312 2 137 51 0
313 5 252 153 198 219 178 0
314 2 240 76 0
315 3 8 118 166 0
316 3 252 147 122 0
317 4 161 37 187 252 0
318 1 254 0
319 5 65 137 186 174 88 0
320 2 126 134 0
321 4 121 96 61 194 0
322 1 168 0
323 3 77 229 125 0
324 2 134 208 0
325 2 172 70 0
326 3 57 172 193 0
327 2 38 47 0
328 3 141 168 169 0
329 4 125 10 161 232 0
330 6 230 62 147 8 58 113 0
331 6 55 180 142 169 119 69 0
332 5 147 130 25 51 68 0
333 6 61 184 170 105 22 96 0
334 6 231 172 178 183 162 130 0
335 5 141 126 198 180 24 0
Continued . . .
Test Len Params Beh
336 2 160 209 0
337 3 17 222 239 0
338 1 186 0
339 5 6 193 177 225 125 0
340 4 123 193 128 24 0
341 1 50 0
342 4 16 164 181 50 0
343 3 50 235 27 0
344 5 237 183 55 168 237 0
345 3 225 181 10 0
346 5 119 41 132 209 114 0
347 6 229 67 164 112 174 212 0
348 1 242 0
349 1 30 0
350 5 198 153 173 45 2 0
351 5 16 84 163 49 46 0
352 1 91 0
353 3 51 208 133 0
354 1 234 0
355 4 226 14 216 158 0
356 5 157 238 116 136 136 0
357 1 122 0
358 2 21 7 0
359 1 247 0
360 3 217 187 210 0
361 3 67 96 164 0
362 4 104 195 192 95 0
363 1 184 0
364 6 181 184 255 105 24 132 0
365 4 26 98 192 178 0
366 4 74 202 132 29 0
367 2 227 36 0
368 6 6 62 91 155 32 17 0
369 1 119 0
370 2 124 8 0
371 3 215 91 218 0
372 2 98 200 0
373 4 14 50 65 22 0
374 3 63 3 74 0
375 5 165 187 173 255 197 0
376 1 245 0
377 4 188 15 236 155 0
378 4 42 40 95 205 0
379 5 194 104 222 137 72 0
380 4 37 23 70 163 0
381 1 116 0
382 6 5 255 206 75 111 126 0
383 2 170 127 0
Continued . . .
Test Len Params Beh
384 4 220 96 231 71 0
385 3 179 218 105 0
386 2 208 218 0
387 4 172 80 249 227 0
388 5 160 187 216 106 70 0
389 3 69 246 65 0
390 1 8 0
391 3 13 199 56 0
392 5 63 47 161 194 48 0
393 4 152 221 58 88 0
394 6 212 112 143 253 80 149 0
395 1 4 0
396 1 57 0
397 1 106 0
398 5 251 216 241 5 169 0
399 3 55 201 128 0
400 3 147 208 161 0
401 3 36 208 68 0
402 4 19 209 117 198 0
403 6 226 74 140 73 77 7 0
404 5 112 42 214 24 210 0
405 4 193 101 147 178 0
406 6 201 82 32 155 67 28 0
407 5 81 201 21 27 209 0
408 2 1 220 0
409 6 119 59 118 219 189 179 0
410 3 199 216 8 0
411 3 55 189 44 0
412 4 52 27 51 48 0
413 2 11 21 0
414 4 243 153 177 79 0
415 1 220 0
416 5 111 254 17 141 243 0
417 2 43 8 0
418 6 44 84 63 16 65 77 0
419 1 159 0
420 1 134 0
421 3 217 48 7 0
422 6 50 49 255 180 193 176 0
423 6 164 249 65 159 45 148 0
424 5 52 201 58 61 204 0
425 3 108 187 255 0
426 2 238 126 0
427 6 117 2 24 147 83 155 0
428 4 156 194 61 84 0
429 3 238 17 128 0
430 6 177 139 61 41 41 201 0
431 4 165 191 219 133 0
Continued . . .
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Test Len Params Beh
432 2 158 89 0
433 3 79 222 43 0
434 2 74 115 0
435 6 139 178 111 170 168 17 0
436 4 170 64 146 79 0
437 2 202 217 0
438 1 134 0
439 3 209 225 243 0
440 1 121 0
441 6 233 83 227 68 179 143 0
442 5 107 240 255 210 172 0
443 2 155 28 0
444 3 227 39 1 0
445 1 231 0
446 3 96 13 16 0
447 6 22 87 147 20 99 235 0
448 4 220 12 152 47 0
449 1 51 0
450 6 125 198 39 231 54 141 0
451 5 188 197 136 188 149 0
452 3 202 77 54 0
453 2 179 135 0
454 2 108 115 0
455 2 188 104 0
456 2 128 182 0
457 4 131 66 58 101 0
458 5 105 109 222 5 15 0
459 1 94 0
460 1 153 0
461 2 0 51 0
462 6 190 14 36 30 58 174 0
463 2 221 228 0
464 2 159 140 0
465 6 31 197 34 60 139 51 0
466 6 199 194 214 214 92 118 0
467 4 30 3 48 58 0
468 2 30 98 0
469 6 93 87 183 10 114 67 0
470 6 216 156 29 149 27 171 0
471 6 148 161 5 251 121 232 0
472 6 175 84 248 186 136 163 0
473 6 10 111 32 132 240 22 0
474 6 127 10 161 199 209 25 0
475 6 222 73 226 207 164 224 0
476 3 130 227 205 0
477 3 48 141 17 0
478 5 106 110 206 8 21 0
479 5 40 85 255 182 86 0
Continued . . .
Test Len Params Beh
480 5 85 50 235 114 99 0
481 4 56 90 23 26 0
482 6 17 7 234 44 143 124 0
483 3 251 214 163 0
484 1 41 0
485 6 58 149 210 132 115 155 0
486 5 185 229 104 6 33 0
487 6 163 177 131 120 107 13 0
488 1 208 0
489 6 47 206 106 72 108 161 0
490 2 147 159 0
491 3 68 100 15 0
492 6 237 162 31 126 206 59 0
493 2 223 211 0
494 4 179 152 103 9 0
495 5 21 62 191 64 129 0
496 3 23 255 181 0
497 6 240 6 19 27 247 9 0
498 2 5 13 0
499 6 236 224 223 233 173 199 0
500 2 240 10 0
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Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) are a growing subset of the emerging Internet of Things (IoT). WSNs reduce the cost
of deployment over wired alternatives; consequently, use is increasing in home automation, critical infrastructure, smart
metering, and security solutions. Few published works evaluate the security of proprietary WSN protocols due to the lack
of low-cost and eective research tools. One such protocol is ITU-T G.9959-based Z-Wave, which maintains wide
acceptance within the IoT market. This research utilizes a open source toolset, presented herein, called EZ-Wave to
identify methods for exploiting Z-Wave devices and networks using Software-Dened Radios (SDR). Herein, techniques
enabling active network reconnaissance, including network enumeration and device interrogation, are presented.
Furthermore, a fuzzing framework is presented and utilized to identify three packet malformations resulting in anomalous
device behavior. Finally, a method for classifying the three most common Z-Wave transceivers with >99% accuracy
using preamble manipulation is identied and tested.
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